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We investigate whether excess control rights of ultimate owners in pyramids affect banks' 
adjustment to their target capital ratio. When ultimate control rights and cash-flow rights are 
identical, banks increase their capital ratio by issuing equity and by reshuffling their assets 
without slowing their lending. However, when control rights exceed cash-flow rights, banks 
are reluctant to issue equity to increase their capital ratio and, instead, shrink their assets by 
mainly cutting their lending. A deeper investigation shows that this behavior is only apparent 
in family-controlled banks and in countries with relatively weak shareholder protection rights. 
Our findings provide new insights in the capital structure adjustment process and have critical 
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1. Introduction  
 Although banks are more leveraged than nonfinancial firms and are subject to regulatory 
minimum capital requirements, both theoretical (e.g., Orgler and Taggart, 1983; Myers and 
Rajan, 1998; Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2011) and empirical 
studies (e.g., Marcus, 1983; Flannery and Rangan, 2008) indicate that, like other firms, banks 
also have a target capital structure. The determinants of banks' capital structure are also found 
to be similar to those documented for nonfinancial firms (Gropp and Heider, 2011). 
Moreover, minimum capital requirements might not be binding since banks set the target 
capital ratio well above the regulatory minima (Ayuso, Pérez, and Saurina, 2004; Lindquist, 
2004) and as a consequence such regulations might not affect banks’ capital ratio adjustment 
as long as they are not violated (Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee, and Öztekin, 2008). 
However, banks are also known to adjust to their target capital ratio faster than nonfinancial 
firms (Memmel and Raupach, 2010). Banks' assets are more liquid and banks can more easily 
adjust the size of their operations by expanding or shrinking their assets to reach the target 
capital structure.          
In this paper, we question whether the way banks adjust to the target capital structure can be 
explained by internal governance mechanisms and specifically by excess control rights in 
pyramidal ownership structures. Excess control rights arise when the controlling shareholder 
has greater control rights than cash-flow rights.
1
 If, under certain conditions, controlling 
shareholders are more inclined to reap private benefits of control at the expense of minority 
shareholders, they will strongly value their controlling position. Such controlling shareholders 
might actually be reluctant to issue new equity that could dilute their private benefits of 
control.
2
 Aversion to losing these benefits, to which we refer to as control dilution, will 
depend on the extent of such benefits. Extraction of private benefits is known to be easier in 
pyramids where controlling shareholders can enhance their control and achieve greater 
divergence between control and cash-flow rights.
3
 Such divergence provides the ability and 
the incentives to extract private benefits of control (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 
                                                          
1
 For more details on pyramidal ownership structure and specifically excess control rights see, e.g., La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000;  and Faccio and Lang, 2002. 
2
 The controlling shareholder could bring the required equity himself but this would increase the costs of 
extracting private benefits (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002) by increasing the cash-flow 
rights and therefore the loss in terms of dividends. 
3
 For more details on the expropriation hypothesis within pyramids (extraction of private benefits of control) see, 
e.g., Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; Friedman, Johnson, 
and Mitton, 2003; Joh, 2003; Jiang, Kim, and Pang, 2011; Lin, Ma, and Xuan, 2011. For papers that specifically 
look at banks see, e.g., Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010; Azofra and Santamaría, 2011 and Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and 
Xuan, 2011.  
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2002; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2011). We hence expect the fear of control dilution to be 
stronger in banks controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights, and as a 
consequence, such banks might not evenly weigh the way they choose to move towards the 
target capital ratio. Such banks might be reluctant to (externally) raise equity and would 
presumably first rely on internal resources when possible. Furthermore, they could move to 
the target ratio by adjusting their size and/or by reshuffling their assets more promptly than 
other banks. Specifically, the adjustment process might differently affect bank lending 
depending on the presence or absence of excess control rights.  
To investigate the effect of control dilution, as captured by excess control rights, on banks’ 
adjustment process towards the target, we use a novel and hand-crafted data set on the 
ultimate ownership structure of 341 commercial banks based in 17 Western European 
countries
4
 between 2002 and 2010. We use a partial adjustment model to estimate a bank-
specific and time-varying target capital ratio and to identify the bank’s initial position 
relatively to its target: above or below the target. More specifically, we investigate the various 
channels that banks rely on when they face a capital ratio shortfall (below the target) or 
surplus (above the target) to capture possible differences due to the presence of excess control 
rights. We look into how banks adjust their equity either externally (equity issues 
/repurchases) or internally (higher/lower earnings retention) and also into how they adjust 
their assets and particularly their lending. Indeed, in extreme cases banks could simply 
decrease their capital ratio by extending more loans (funded with new debt) or increase it by 
selling assets or reducing lending (leading to a lower amount of debt). But banks can also 
reallocate their assets to reach a different level of risk-weighted assets if they target a 
regulatory capital ratio such as the Tier1 capital ratio.
5
    
We find that when control and cash-flow rights are equal, below-target banks adjust their 
Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio by issuing new equity and by lowering risk-weighted assets (by 
substituting safer assets to riskier ones) but not by reducing their assets and specifically their 
loans. When they face a surplus, such banks adjust both externally and internally (by 
repurchasing equity and lowering earnings retention) and expand their assets and specifically 
                                                          
4
 We focus on European countries where the presence of excess control rights is more acute compared to other 
countries, for instance, the U.S. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). 
5
 While the literature on firms' capital structure considers the leverage ratio (debt/equity) or identically the 
capital ratio (equity/total assets), in the case of banks some broader measure of regulatory capital is generally 
used. Tier 1 capital is the narrowest definition of regulatory capital in force during our period of study. It is 
composed of ordinary shares and disclosed reserved (e.g., retained earnings, share premium reserves). It also 
includes other capital instruments (for example, preferred shares, hybrid capital securities) which will no more 
be eligible under the Basel III Accords (BIS, 2010a).   
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their lending. However, when control rights exceed cash-flow rights, while they do 
repurchase equity when they face a surplus, banks are reluctant to issue any equity when they 
face a shortfall. In the latter case, banks not only draw on earnings to reach the target capital 
ratio but also shrink their assets in general and their lending in particular. This finding is 
consistent with our prediction that controlling shareholders with excess control rights fear 
dilution of control that may arise from equity issuance. As a consequence, external 
recapitalization is limited and banks rely on internal funds but also on downsizing.   
We also take our investigation further and analyze whether the type of the largest ultimate 
controlling shareholder, the level of shareholder protection rights and the 2008 global 
financial crisis affect the impact of excess control rights on banks’ capital ratio adjustment. 
Consistent with the view that family ownership (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; 
Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) as well as weak shareholder 
protection rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 
2004) increase the incentives of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits of control, 
we find that the impact of excess control rights is only effective for family-owned banks or 
banks operating in countries with relatively weak shareholder protection. Instead of issuing 
equity to move to the target capital ratio, such banks distribute less dividends and cut their 
assets including their loans. Moreover, we show that during the 2008 financial crisis banks 
controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights did issue -just like any other bank- 
equity to adjust to the target instead of cutting their assets and specifically their lending. This 
is consistent with the view that ultimate controlling owners who expect to divert higher 
resources in the future might provide significant support to their firms during a crisis 
(Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton, 2003).   
Our paper makes two main contributions to the capital structure adjustment and corporate 
governance literature. First, we build a bridge between the two strands of the literature by 
exploring the effect of control rights of the bank's ultimate owner in pyramids on capital 
structure adjustment. We investigate differences in the adjustment process towards the target 
capital ratio and particularly whether banks are reluctant to raise (external) equity and 
possibly limit their size and especially their lending in the presence of excess control rights of 
the bank’s ultimate owner. Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2010) argue that banks 
would only limit their lending if issuing equity is more costly because of frictions and 
governance problems. Consistently, in our work, we show that banks do actually not refrain 
from lending except when control rights exceed cash-flow rights under very specific 
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conditions. In the absence of excess control rights, banks do issue equity without slowing 
their lending to increase their capital ratio. By linking ownership structure to bank lending, 
our paper also contributes to the literature investigating the effect of foreign and domestic 
ownership on lending stability (e.g., Claessens and Van Horen (2013a, b) showing that 
foreign banks contributed to financial instability by strongly reducing their lending compared 
to domestic banks during the 2008 financial crisis).
6
 We also add to the literature 
investigating asymmetries and/or cross-variations in the adjustment speed with which firms 
converge to the optimal capital structure (e.g., Byoun, 2008; Öztekin and Flannery, 2012; and 
more specifically Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee, and Öztekin, 2008; Memmel and 
Raupach, 2010 for banks). Our study further contributes to the literature exploring the driving 
factors behind the reluctance of firms to recapitalize (e.g., Dittmar and Thakor (2007) who 
show that firms dislike raising equity if they expect disagreement on investment decisions 
with new investors). Second, unlike previous studies on pyramidal ownership structure (see, 
e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000 and 
Faccio and Lang, 2002 for nonfinancial firms, and Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007 and 
Laeven and Levine, 2009 for banks) which typically focus on the largest publicly traded 
corporations at a given point in time, we gather a broader and more detailed database on 
ultimate ownership structure including large and small institutions, both publicly traded and 
privately owned for three different years of the sample period (2004, 2006 and 2010) to check 
for possible changes in the ultimate ownership structure, especially after the 2008 financial 
crisis.  
Our study also contributes to the debate on the post-crisis bank regulatory framework and 
more specifically on the new standards for capital regulation. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BIS, 2010a) has implemented new rules not only to strengthen the 
existing capital requirements but also to improve the quality of regulatory capital by 
excluding preferred shares, which in general do not carry control rights, from the new and 
narrower definition called Core Tier 1 capital. Such requirements might entail high costs for 
controlling shareholders with excess control rights which, according to our findings, could 
encourage banks not to issue common equity to adjust closer to their target capital ratio. 
Rather, our results show that such controlled banks will adjust by reducing their size and 
                                                          
6
 Other studies investigate whether the implementation of the risk-based capital requirements had an impact on 
bank lending and show that the severity of the 1990-1992 credit crunch in the U.S. can be explained by the 
introduction of more stringent capital rules (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1994; Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Brinkmann 
and Horvitz, 1995). 
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notably their lending activities, and potentially their overall contribution to the real economy. 
Our work also addresses the concerns of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 
2010b) highlighting the relevance of sound corporate governance in the banking industry and 
recommending the disclosure of banking entities’ ownership. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, defines the 
ultimate ownership variables and provides some statistics. In Section 3, we specify the model 
we use to conduct our empirical investigation. Section 4 provides estimation results and 
Section 5 shows robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the paper and provides some policy 
implications.     
2. Data and ultimate ownership variables  
We start by describing our sample and then present the procedure we follow to measure 
excess control rights as well as the characteristics of the computed ownership variables.   
2.1. Sample  
Our study spans the 2002-2010 period and focuses on commercial banks established in 17 
European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and, the 
United Kingdom. Bank-level accounting data used in this study are retrieved from BvD 
Bankscope. To collect our ownership data, we use both Bankscope and Amadeus as primary 
sources. We collect our macroeconomic data from World Development Indicators (The World 
Bank) and Bloomberg and we use Thomson Reuters Advanced Analytics to identify mergers 
and acquisitions involving European commercial banks. For each bank, we use 
unconsolidated data if available; otherwise we use consolidated statements.
7
 For the time 
period and countries covered by our study, we identify 467 banks for which Bankscope 
reports information on our variables of interest, especially the risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio. 
We restrict our sample to institutions actually involved in lending by requiring the bank to 
have a loans to total assets ratio above 10%.
8
 After eliminating extreme bank year 
                                                          
7
 Note that our empirical analysis relies to a large extent on unconsolidated bank statements. In some cases, 
Bankscope provides information for the Tier 1 capital ratio only for consolidated data. We check the robustness 
of our results using unconsolidated data solely.     
8
 Bankscope defines as commercial banks institutions that are mainly active in a combination of retail banking, 
wholesale banking and private banking. This broad definition implies that some banks considered as commercial 
banks exhibit a very low loans to total assets ratio. Since our aim is to analyze banks’ lending behavior, we need 
to further restrict our sample.  
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observations for the main variables (1% lowest and highest values) and 28 banks for which 
we are not able to identify the ultimate controlling owners, we are left with a final sample of 
2,204 annual observations corresponding to 341 commercial banks, 111 of which are listed 
(see Table A1 in Appendix A for a breakdown of these banks by country and Table A2 for 
general descriptive statistics). To gauge the representativeness of our sample, we compare the 
aggregate total assets of our sample banks in a given country to the aggregate total assets of 
all the banks covered by Bankscope in the same country over the 2002-2010 period (see Table 
A1 in Appendix A). On average, our final sample covers more than 78% of banks' total assets 
in the considered countries.  
2.2. Building of control chains and ultimate ownership variables  
To measure the ultimate owner’s excess control rights, we first need to build the control 
chains to identify the ultimate controlling owners for each bank. Although prior studies (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007; Laeven and 
Levine, 2008, 2009) argue that ownership structure is stable over time, we construct the 
control chain for each bank for the years 2004, 2006 and 2010.
9
 Data from 2004 and 2006 are 
used to reflect ownership prior to the 2008 global financial crisis. To capture possible changes 
stemming from government intervention during the crisis we also use ownership information 
from 2010.
10
   
To build the control chains, we need to define a threshold (minimum percentage of shares 
held) to identify each owner along the chain. Following previous studies on both banks 
(Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2009) and nonfinancial firms (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Laeven and Levine, 2008), we use a control 
threshold of 10% assuming that it provides a significant fraction of votes for effective control. 
We first identify the major shareholders (those holding at least 10% of the shares) of each 
bank by gathering data on direct ownership from Bankscope using DVDs issued in 2004, 
2006 and 2010 and complete it with information from annual reports disclosed in the banks’ 
web sites. We classify a bank as controlled if it has at least one shareholder with 10% or more 
of total outstanding shares. Otherwise, we consider the bank to be widely held. If some of the 
identified major shareholders are independent (such as a family or a state), that is, if they are 
                                                          
9
 Bankscope and Amadeus do not provide detailed information on ownership structure, namely on the type of the 
shareholder (firm, bank, institutional investors and so on) before 2004.   
10
 Bankscope and Amadeus update ownership data every 18 months and historical data are not disclosed; 
information is only provided for the last changes with the corresponding dates. 
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not controlled by another shareholder, we consider them to be the ultimate controlling 
owners. If, however, some or all of the major shareholders identified at this first level of the 
control chain are themselves financial or nonfinancial corporations, we go deeper and build 
indirect control chains by identifying their owners, the owners of their owners until we reach 
ultimate shareholders.
11
 Since Bankscope provides ownership information only for banks, we 
use the Amadeus database together with annual reports (still considering data from 2004, 
2006 and 2010) to collect ownership data on nonfinancial firms that are major shareholders at 
the intermediate levels of indirect control chains.  
The control chains that we build are used to compute voting and cash-flow rights (and 
excess control rights) by following the method initially proposed by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999). An ultimate controlling owner can hold a bank through a direct 
and/or an indirect control chain. The aggregate voting rights of an ultimate controlling owner 
(ControlRights) are the sum of direct and indirect voting rights held in the bank. Direct voting 
rights involve shares registered in the ultimate controlling shareholder’s name whereas 
indirect voting rights refer to the shares held by entities that the ultimate shareholder controls 
at least at the 10% level. When a bank is controlled by multiple ultimate owners,
12
 we define 
the ultimate controlling shareholder as the owner with the greatest voting rights. The 
aggregate cash-flow rights (Cash-flowRights) of an ultimate controlling shareholder are the 
sum of direct and indirect cash-flow rights held in the bank. While direct cash-flow rights 
refer to the percentage of shares directly held in the bank, indirect cash-flow rights are 
calculated as the product of the percentages of shares held by the shareholders along the 
indirect control chain linking the ultimate controlling owner to the bank. If the bank is widely 
held (there is no controlling owner) or if the control chain is a cross-holding
13
 we set voting 
rights and cash-flow rights equal to zero.   
Substantial divergence between voting and cash-flow rights may exist in the presence of 
                                                          
11
 Given a control threshold of 10%, the maximum number of controlling shareholders at each level of the bank’s 
control chain is equal to ten. If n stands for the number of levels in the control chain, the maximum number of 
ultimate controlling owners for a control threshold of 10% is 10
n
. In our sample, the maximum number of 
intermediate levels necessary to trace the indirect control chain until the ultimate owner is eight. The number of 
different ultimate controlling owners for a given bank in our sample also reaches a maximum of eight.  
12
 Over the 2002-2010 period, among the set of controlled banks in our sample, 223 are continuously classified 
as controlled by a single ultimate owner and 60 are continuously classified as controlled by multiple ultimate 
owners while 32 banks switch from one category to the other. 
13
 A bank’s control chain is a cross-holding at the 10% threshold if a corporation holds a stake of at least 10% in 





 We define excess control rights as the difference between voting and 
cash-flow rights (ExcessControl=ControlRights-Cash-flowRights) as in La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999). We then classify the sampled banks into two groups: banks 
without excess control rights (ExcessControl=0) and banks with excess control rights 
(ExcessControl>0).
15
 A bank is classified as without excess control rights if (i) it is controlled 
by an ultimate owner with equal voting and cash-flow rights, (ii) it is widely held or (iii) if its 
control chain is a cross-holding. A bank is classified as with excess control rights if it is 
controlled by an ultimate owner with greater voting than cash-flow rights.
16
  
Fig. 1 provides a simple example of a control chain to illustrate how we identify the ultimate 
controlling owners of each bank and how we compute voting and cash-flow rights based on 
the method proposed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999). Three entities C6, 
C4 and C5 are identified as the ultimate controlling owners of the bank reported in Fig. 1. The 
largest ultimate controlling owner (with the greatest voting rights) is C6. This ultimate 
controlling owner holds the bank directly and indirectly through two other intermediate 
corporations C1 and C3. Direct voting rights of C6 are identical to his direct cash-flow rights 
and equal to 40%. Indirect voting rights of this ultimate controlling owner are equal to 30% 
(the percentage of shares held by C1) whereas indirect cash-flow rights are equal to 0.6% 
(10% 20% 30%). The aggregate voting rights of C6 are hence equal to 70% (30 40) 
whereas the aggregate cash-flow rights are 40.6% (0.6+40). The difference between both 
aggregate rights (excess control rights) of C6 is equal to 29.4% (70 - 40.6). 
[Insert Fig. 1 about here] 
2.3. Ultimate ownership characteristics and financial profiles of the sample banks   
Our data set indicates that 83% of the observations refer to banks controlled by at least one 
                                                          
14
 The divergence between voting and cash-flow rights may arise from both indirect control chains (pyramids 
and multiple holdings) and dual class shares. Bankscope and Amadeus measure ownership using the voting 
rights and do not provide information on cash-flow rights. Given the information we have and in line with 
previous literature (Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007; Laeven and Levine 2009), we consider the divergence 
between voting and cash-flow rights stemming from indirect control chains. We do not view this as a serious 
shortcoming for our study as previous studies (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; Faccio and Lang, 
2002; Azofra and Santamaría, 2011) show that the use of dual class shares is relatively scarce.  
15
 Ownership structure and particularly the divergence between voting and cash-flow rights can to some extent 
change over time; accordingly, the classification of banks as without or with excess control rights might also 
change. Amongst the 341 banks in our sample, 195 are continuously categorized as without excess control rights 
and 113 as with excess control rights while 33 banks switch from one category to the other over the sample 
period. 
16
 In our sample, the difference between both rights (ExcessControl) is generally relatively high. It is lower than 
10% only in the case of five banks and we classify them as banks with excess control rights.   
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ultimate shareholder. Amongst banks that are controlled, 57% of the observations relate to an 
ultimate shareholder with equal control and cash-flow rights and 43% to an ultimate 
shareholder with excess control rights. This sample composition allows us to accurately 
conduct our empirical investigation. 
We report in Table 1 summary statistics on the computed ultimate ownership variables 
(ControlRights, Cash-flowRights and ExcessControl) for both the subsamples of banks 
without and with excess control rights. For banks without excess control rights, voting and 
cash-flow rights both amount to about 51%, on average. Amongst these banks, those that are 
controlled by an ultimate owner exhibit, on average, a higher percentage.
17
 In such a case, an 
ultimate controlling shareholder is more inclined towards profit maximization (Azofra and 
Santamaría, 2011). For banks with excess control rights, the largest ultimate controlling 
shareholder holds on average more than 80% of the voting rights and only around 36% of the 
cash-flow rights. This leads to an average divergence between voting rights and cash-flow 
rights of almost 44%. As cash-flow rights are more than two times lower than voting rights, 
the ultimate controlling shareholder would be more inclined to extract private benefits and, in 
turn, to protect his voting rights rather than his cash-flow rights. 
Table 2 reports information on the type of the largest ultimate controlling owner. It shows 
differences for banks without or with excess control rights. For banks without excess control 
rights, the largest ultimate controlling owner is predominantly (almost 42% of the 
observations) another bank (Bank). This proportion is more than two times lower for banks 
with excess control rights (more than 17% of the observations). This is consistent with the 
view that banks, when they are controlling shareholders, are less likely to engage in 
expropriation as the resulting benefits are distributed among multiple owners and also because 
regulation, when stringently enforced, makes expropriation more costly (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006; Haw, Ho, Hu, and Wu, 2010). Not surprisingly, individuals/families
18
 (Family) and 
states
19
 (State) are the predominant largest ultimate controlling shareholders of banks with 
                                                          
17
 This percentage amounts to 69 which is not reported in Table 1.  
18
 We follow La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) by classifying a bank as family controlled if the 
controlling shareholder is a person. We therefore include banks that are controlled by a manager inside this 
category. Note that in our sample only six banks are controlled by managers, four of which are banks with excess 
control rights.  
19
 The proportion of state ownership in the full sample (10.03%) is higher than in previous studies (Faccio and 
Lang, 2002; Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007). This is because we consider not only large and publicly traded 
banks but also small and privately owned banks and because of the outcome of the 2008 financial crisis with 
massive government intervention either by capital injections and/or by nationalizations. Before the crisis (2002-
2006), state ownership represents 4.72% of the observations in the sample of 341 banks, which is almost similar 
to what is reported in previous studies (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007). 
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excess control rights (around 30% and 22% of the observations respectively). However, they 
are less present in banks without excess control rights (about 15% and 3% of the observations 
respectively). The divergence between both rights could enable ultimate controlling owners, 
and especially families, to expropriate minority shareholders and divert a larger fraction of 
resources (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006). 
Institutional investors (Institutional) and industrial companies (Industry) are also more 
frequently present as ultimate controlling shareholders in banks with excess control rights 
(around 16% and 9% of the observations respectively) than in banks without excess control 
rights (nearly 8% and 2% of the observations respectively). Foundations (Foundation) are 
quite evenly distributed between the two subsamples of banks without and with excess control 
rights, with a much weaker presence as shareholders in both cases. Table 2 also reports the 
extent of widely held banks and cross-holdings in the subsample of banks without excess 
control rights. They respectively represent about 24% and 2% of the observations. 
Table 3 compares the summary statistics on key financial variables for the subsamples of 
banks without and with excess control rights. Banks with excess control rights rely more on 
traditional intermediation activities (higher loans to total assets ratio). In line with the 
expropriation hypothesis of pyramidal ownership structure (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and 
Lang, 2002; Azofra and Santamaría, 2011), they have poorer loan quality (higher proportion 
of non-performing loans) and are less profitable (lower return on assets and return on equity). 
The table also shows that banks with excess control rights hold lower Tier 1 capital ratios 
(either risk-based or not), possibly because of the fear of control dilution. Furthermore, banks 
with excess control rights are less likely to pay dividends, presumably to more easily increase 
their capital ratios via internal funds or because of the effect of expropriation (Faccio, Lang, 
and Young, 2001).   
[Insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here] 
We now move to the approach we follow to investigate the impact of excess control rights 
on the bank’s adjustment process towards the target capital ratio. 
3. Methodology 
In this paper, we question whether the way banks adjust their capital ratio towards the target 
level is affected by the ultimate owner’s excess control rights. Banks have two options that 
can be combined to reach their target capital ratio: they can adjust the numerator (equity 
issues/repurchases and/or earnings retention) and/or the denominator (assets adjustment 
12 
 
and/or risk-weighted assets) of their capital ratio. Depending on their control/ownership 
pattern, banks might not uniformly weigh these different adjustment options. Specifically, 
banks controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights might be reluctant to issue equity 
since external recapitalization can lead to control dilution. Instead, such banks are likely to 
increase retained earnings and/or decrease their size (loans or other assets) or risk-weighted 
assets (asset substitution) when they need to increase their capital ratio.  
Our approach involves two steps. We first consider a partial adjustment model to estimate a 
bank-specific and time-varying target capital ratio and the gap between the target and the 
lagged actual capital ratios. We then investigate how banks increase or decrease their capital 
ratio to adjust to the target by modifying their regulatory capital (numerator) and/or assets 
(denominator) depending on their controlling owners’ excess control rights.  
3.1. Estimating the target capital ratio and computing deviations from the target 
 We model the target capital ratio as a function of the bank’s and country’s characteristics 
(e.g., Marcus, 1983; Gropp and Heider, 2011) as follows: 
     
                            
                     (1)  
where    is the target level of the bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio defined as Tier 1 regulatory 
capital divided by either total assets (Tier1TA) or risk-weighted assets (Tier1RWA);
20
   is a 
vector of observable variables: the dummy variable ExcessCR
21
 that captures the presence of 
excess control rights,
22
 bank size (Log(Assets)), the return on assets (ROA), the ratio of loan 
                                                          
20
 In this study, we focus exclusively on the Tier 1 capital ratio (risk-based or nonrisk-based) and ignore the total 
capital ratio. Tier 1 capital is mainly composed of ordinary shares. Tier 2 capital does not involve voting rights 
and therefore the fear of control dilution might not be observed in changes in the total regulatory capital (Tier 1 
+ Tier 2). 
21
 To capture excess control rights, we define a dummy variable ExcessCR which is equal to one if the voting 
rights are greater than the cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise. We use a binary variable which we consider to 
be more accurate than a continuous variable in our specific setting: (i) a binary variable is more likely to be 
independent of the method used to compute indirect control rights, the last link principle (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Azofra and Santamaría, 2011) or the weakest link principle method (e.g., 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2011); phrased differently, qualitatively, the 
two available methods would give the same classification (a bank with or without excess control rights) but 
quantitatively the computed excess control rights can be very different with the two methods; (ii) we have not 
collected ownership data on a continuous basis (every year), a binary variable is more likely to remain stable 
over time; (iii) we do not account for excess control rights that may arise from the existence of dual class shares; 
(vi) in our sample, the difference between both rights is generally relatively high; it is lower than 10% only in the 
case of five banks. 
22
 We include the dummy variable ExcessCR because, on average, banks without excess control rights exhibit 
higher Tier 1 capital ratios than banks with excess control rights (see Table 3). Our specification is hence flexible 




loss provisions (LoanlossProv), the ratio of net loans to total assets (Loans), the ratio of long 
term market funding to total funding as a proxy of market discipline (MarketDiscipline) and a 
dummy variable for listed banks (Listed); GDPGrowth is the annual growth rate of real GDP 
for country c (see Table A3 in Appendix A for a description of these variables and summary 
statistics).
23
 Time-varying explanatory variables are lagged by one year to avoid simultaneity. 
Country and Year are respectively vectors of country and year dummies.    is a vector of 
bank fixed effects.  
The model specified in Eq. (1) assumes that banks will always maintain their capital ratio at 
its target level. This is only possible in a frictionless world. In practice, banks need time to 
adjust their capital and their assets to modify their capital ratio and move to the target level. 
Hence, to account for adjustment costs, we consider a partial adjustment framework (Eq. (2)) 
where banks adjust a constant portion   (  is a scalar adjustment speed,   [   ] with higher 
values of   indicating faster adjustment) of the gap between the target and the lagged actual 
capital ratios: 
               (    
        )        (2)  
Substituting Eq. (1) into Eq. (2) and rearranging gives the following estimation model:   
      (   )        (                          
                  )        (3)  
We use the average adjustment speed ( ̂) and the vector of coefficients24 obtained from 
estimating Eq. (3) to compute a fitted value of the target Tier 1 capital ratio
25
 for each bank 
every year ( ̂   
 ). This bank-specific and time-varying estimated target capital ratio is then 
used to compute the gap (Gapit-1) between the estimated target capital ratio ( ̂   
 ) and the 
lagged actual capital ratio (      ) as follows:  
             ̂   
         (4)  
                                                          
23
 On the whole, the correlations among the explanatory variables used to estimate the target capital ratio are 
low.   
24
 We estimate Eq. (3) using the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The 
results are reported in Table A4 in Appendix A. As shown in Table A4, the coefficients estimates are generally 
significant and their signs are, on the whole, consistent with previous studies (see Table A3 in Appendix A for 
the expected signs).    
25
 Note that the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq. (3) are the product of the adjustment speed ( ) and the 
variable’s contribution to the bank’s target capital ratio. Hence, to get the parameter value of the contribution of 
each variable we divide the estimated regression coefficient for that variable by the adjustment speed  . The 
estimated values of the target capital ratio are computed from Eq. (1) as follows: 
  ̂   
    ̂        ̂                 ̂          ̂       ̂     
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Our objective is to test whether banks controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights 
are reluctant to raise equity and therefore downsize by possibly refraining from lending. We 
hence separate the cases where banks are above the target (kSurplus) and below the target 
(kDeficit) and for easier interpretation of the results we consider the absolute value of the gap 
(Gapit-1):   
 
              |        | if          ̂   
  , and zero otherwise 
                |        | if          ̂   
  , and zero otherwise 
(5)  
When the lagged actual capital ratio is above the target level, the bank faces a capital ratio 
surplus (kSurplus). In this case, the bank can adjust towards the target capital ratio by (i) 
decreasing its capital (equity repurchase and/or lower earnings retention) or (ii) expanding its 
assets (by lending more and/or investing in other assets) or its risk-weighted assets. When the 
lagged actual capital ratio is below the target level, the bank faces a shortfall (kDeficit). In 
such a case, to move to the target level, it needs to (i) increase its capital (by issuing new 
equity and/or limiting dividend distribution) or (ii) reduce its assets (by shrinking lending 
and/or other assets) or its risk-weighted assets.  
3.2.  Excess control rights and adjustments towards the target capital ratio  
Our aim is to investigate how banks respond to a capital ratio deficit or surplus when they 
are controlled by a shareholder with equal control and cash-flow rights or by a shareholder 
with excess control rights. 
Banks can change their capital (thereafter referred to as capital adjustment) either externally 
by issuing/repurchasing equity or internally by distributing lower or larger amounts of 
earnings.
26
 Differentiating between external and internal changes in capital is important to test 
whether banks controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights are reluctant to issue 
equity when they are below their target capital ratio. As a proxy for the level of capital, we 
use the Tier 1 regulatory capital. We hence define external change in capital (denoted 
thereafter Tier1) as the annual change in the level of Tier 1 capital minus the amount of 
retained earnings, all scaled by average assets defined as: (total assets at time t + total assets at 
time t-1)/2. Internal change in capital (thereafter RetainedEarnings) is measured by the 
amount of retained earnings scaled by average assets. Banks can also adjust their assets to 
                                                          
26
 Annual change in capital can be expressed as the annual change in external capital plus the current amount of 
retained earnings, where retained earnings are defined as the current net income minus the current dividend 
payment.   
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move closer to the target capital ratio. We capture such adjustments (thereafter referred to as 
assets adjustment) using the annual change (scaled by average assets) in the following 
outcomes: total assets, net loans (excluding interbank loans) and risk-weighted assets, denoted 
thereafter Assets, Loans and RWA respectively. We hence specify the following dynamic 
model:  
 
     (             )              (               )                      
                  
            
                       
(6)  
where y is the dependent variable which accounts either for capital adjustment (Tier1, 
RetainedEarnings) or assets adjustment (Assets, Loans or RWA); kSurplus and kDeficit 
refer to the absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged actual ratios when the 
bank is above or below the target level respectively; ExcessCR is a dummy variable capturing 
the presence of excess control rights;
 
Z and V are respectively vectors of bank- and country-
level control variables.
27
 Time-varying bank- and country-level control variables are lagged 
(one year) to deal with possible endogeneity issues. Bank-level control variables are: the 
dummy variable ExcessCR; the deposits to assets ratio as a measure of funding structure 
(Deposits); the natural logarithm of bank age as a proxy of growth opportunities (Log(Age)); 
a rescue dummy (Rescue) to control for banks which were rescued during the 2008 crisis; an 
index for cross listed banks (CrossListed) which might more easily raise equity than banks 
listed on a single stock exchange or privately owned banks; and finally a merger acquisition 
dummy (Merger) to account for banks which experienced a merger-acquisition event during 
the period we study. Control variables computed at the country-level (V) include the 3-month 
interbank rate (3MInterbankRate) and the growth rate of real GDP (GDPGrowth) to account 
for macroeconomic conditions as well as an indicator of the size and depth of a country’s 
stock market (StockTraded) defined as the stock market capitalization (value of listed shares) 
to GDP ratio. Similarly to Eq. (1) and Eq. (3), Country and Year respectively denote vectors 
of country and year dummies. 
The parameters    and     refer to banks without excess control rights (ExcessCR=0). They 
measure the extent to which capital and assets are modified by such banks to adjust to the 
target capital ratio downwards (kSurplus) and upwards (kDeficit) respectively. As argued 
above, banks without excess control rights might indifferently adjust their capital ratio 
upwards and downwards because their ultimate controlling owners do not fear control 
                                                          
27
 See Table A5 in Appendix A for the definition and the descriptive statistics for the variables used to estimate 
Eq. (6). The correlations among the main explanatory variables (Z and V) are generally very low.   
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dilution. When they are below their target, we expect these banks to increase their capital 
internally and externally without strongly reducing their loans and other assets:      positive 
and significant for capital adjustment variables and     non-significant or significant and 
negative for assets adjustment variables. When they are above the target, they are expected to 
decrease their capital internally and externally to temper asset expansion (   negative and 
significant for capital adjustment variables and non-significant for assets adjustment 
variables) and/or increase their assets (   significant and positive for assets adjustment 
variables).  
The parameters       and         refer to banks with excess control rights 
(ExcessCR=1) and respectively correspond to the proportion of capital and assets used to 
adjust the capital ratio downwards (kSurplus) and upwards (kDeficit). When they are below 
their target, banks with excess control rights are expected to be reluctant to issue equity (    
significant and negative for Tier1). In the extreme case, such banks might not be issuing 
equity at all (if the sum         is not significantly different from zero). Such banks might 
increase their retained earnings and/or shrink their assets (loans or other assets). We hence 
expect the sum         to be significantly positive with regards to earnings retention 
(RetainedEarnings) and significantly negative for assets adjustment variables (Assets, 
Loans and RWA), indicating that such banks counterbalance their reluctance to raise 
equity by increasing retained earnings and/or deleveraging. When they are above their target, 
because control dilution is not an issue, such banks are expected to behave similarly to banks 
without excess control rights (      significant for Tier1 and significant or non-significant 
for RetainedEarnings, Assets, Loans and RWA).  
4. Results  
We first investigate the link between excess control rights and the bank’s capital ratio 
adjustment and then look at various factors that could influence such a relationship.  
4.1. Effect of excess control rights on adjustments towards the target capital ratio  
In this study, we aim to test for differences in banks' responses to deviations from their 
target capital ratio depending on the presence or absence of excess control rights.   
We estimate the coefficients of the dynamic panel model presented in Eq. (6) using the 
Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). We check the validity of 
17 
 
the GMM instruments (lagged values) using the Hansen test (a test of exogeneity of all 
instruments as a group) and the Arellano and Bond test for the absence of second order 
residual autocorrelation (AR2 test). Table 4 reports the results with the two different 
definitions of the Tier 1 capital ratio we use (Tier1TA and Tier1RWA) and all the dependent 
variables used to capture capital adjustment (Tier1 and RetainedEarnings) and assets 
adjustment (Assets, Loans and RWA). 
Based on the results in Table 4,
28
 banks controlled by a shareholder with equal control and 
cash-flow rights respond to a capital ratio surplus (kSurplus) by both reducing capital and 
expanding assets. The decrease in capital is achieved both externally (equity repurchase) and 
internally (reduction in earnings retention):    is negative and significant for Tier1 and 
RetainedEarnings. Such banks expand their assets, in particular their lending, and increase 
their risk-weighted assets by substituting riskier assets to safer ones (   positive and 
significant for Assets, Loans and RWA). When they face a capital ratio shortfall 
(kDeficit), such banks converge to the target by issuing new equity (    positive and 
significant for Tier1). Such banks do not increase their capital internally but most 
importantly they do not decrease their assets and particularly their lending (    non-
significant for RetainedEarnings, Assets and Loans) although they do to some extent 
reshuffle their assets as shown by the results with the risk-based Tier 1 ratio (Tier1RWA). On 
the whole, these results suggest that the ultimate controlling owners of such banks do not fear 
control dilution and increase their capital ratio by issuing equity without reducing their assets 
and particularly their lending. 
When they are above their target capital ratio, banks controlled by a shareholder with excess 
control rights are found to decrease their capital through equity repurchases (      
significant for Tier1) but they do not expand their assets by increasing their lending and do 
not reshuffle their assets (      non-significant for Assets, Loans and RWA). When 
such banks are below their target, conversely to banks with equal control and cash-flow 
rights, they do not issue equity (    significant and         non-significant for Tier1) 
which is consistent with our conjecture that ultimate owners with excess control rights fear 
control dilution. Alternatively, these banks adopt other adjustment methods to preserve the 
                                                          
28
 Note that in all the regressions, we report the results obtained when the dummy variable ExcessCR is included 
among the explanatory variables in Eq. (3) to estimate the target ratio for each bank (see Table A4 in Appendix 
A). We obtain almost similar results (not reported here but available on request) when we compute kSurplus and 
kDeficit on the basis of a target estimated without the dummy variable ExcessCR (columns referred to as 
Baseline in Table A4 of Appendix A).        
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control power of the ultimate owners: they counterbalance their reluctance to issue new equity 
by increasing their capital internally (        positive and significant for RetainedEarnings) 
but also by shrinking/reshuffling their assets and particularly their loans (        negative 
and significant for Assets, Loans and RWA).  
Our results are not only statistically significant but also economically meaningful. A one 
standard deviation (2.61) increase in the capital ratio shortfall leads to a decrease in Loans 
by 28% of its mean (corresponding to a strong deceleration in loan growth) for banks with 
excess control rights but does not affect loan growth for banks without excess control rights. 
A one standard deviation (2.35) increase in the capital ratio surplus is associated with a 19% 
increase in Loans, a 23% decrease in Tier1 and a 21% decrease in RetainedEarnings (of 
their means) for banks without excess control rights. For banks with excess control rights 
such a change in the capital ratio surplus is only associated with a decrease in Tier1 by 29% 
of its mean.  
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
On the whole, our results show that banks adjust to their target capital ratio differently when 
they are controlled by a shareholder without or with excess control rights. Particularly, banks 
with excess control rights do not raise equity to adjust to the target. Instead, they rely on 
earnings retention and sharply reduce their expansion, particularly in lending. Our findings 
also show that banks without excess control rights adjust to the target -by issuing equity- 
without slowing their lending activities. Our results are consistent with Admati, DeMarzo, 
Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2010) who argue that banks should be able to expand their lending 
even if they had to increase their regulatory capital as long as there is no reluctance to issue 
equity due to specific governance arrangements within the bank. Our findings show that such 
reluctance is possible and can effectively affect lending for a large number of banks in 
Europe.  
We now go further by analyzing the conditions under which the fear of control dilution is 
more or less pronounced with possibly stronger implications.      
4.2. Factors affecting the link between excess control rights and capital ratio adjustment   
Our main results support the conjecture that the ultimate controlling shareholders with 
excess control rights avoid issuing equity and instead draw on earnings and decrease their 
assets and particularly their loans to increase the capital ratio, possibly to preserve their 
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control power. To take our investigation further, we consider some factors that might 
strengthen or weaken the relationship between excess control rights and the bank’s adjustment 
process towards the target: (i) the type of the largest ultimate controlling shareholder, (ii) the 
level of shareholder protection rights, and (iii) the 2008 global financial crisis.
29
    
4.2.1. Largest ultimate controlling owner type   
Incentives to extract private benefits of control can vary across different types of controlling 
shareholders. As argued by Villalonga and Amit (2006), if the controlling shareholder is a 
widely held institution (bank, industrial firm, mutual fund and so on), the private benefits of 
control are diluted among multiple owners and as a consequence, the incentives to expropriate 
are weak. If, however, the controlling shareholder is a family or a state, the incentives for 
expropriation might be stronger since families and the state are more able to efficiently divert 
benefits to themselves.
30
 Thus, we examine whether the reluctance to raise equity and the 
reliance on earnings retention and assets downsizing are more pronounced for particular types 
of ultimate controlling owners.   
For this purpose, we classify banks into three categories depending on their ownership type: 
family- (Family) and state-controlled (State) banks and the category Other which is the 
removed category in our model.
31
 The estimation results are presented in Table 5. Our 
previous result indicating that banks with excess control rights do not increase their Tier 1 
capital and, instead, draw on earnings and shrink their assets by mainly cutting their lending, 
only holds for family-controlled banks. When they are controlled by a state, banks with 
excess control rights are not found to be reluctant to issue new equity. In our sample, a large 
part of state ownership comes from government intervention (capital injection and 
nationalizations) during the 2008 financial crisis which might explain our result.   
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In this section, we estimate this equation:      [            (           )        ]              
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              where Factor stands for one of the three variables that are expected to affect the relationship 
between excess control rights and the adjustment process towards the target capital ratio.  
30
 For instance, Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) find that excess control rights are associated with 
discounts in family- and state-controlled corporations’ value (although the effect is very weak in state-owned 
firms), but this relation is not significant when the controlling shareholder is a widely held institution. Lin, Ma, 
Malatesta, and Xuan (2011) find that the positive link between excess control rights and the cost of bank loans is 
stronger for family-owned firms and weaker for state-owned ones. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) find that 
family-controlled firms avoid equity issuing methods that could dilute their control benefits or impose more 
monitoring on them. 
31
 The category Other includes widely held banks (with no controlling shareholder) and banks controlled by a 
widely held financial or nonfinancial corporation. This classification is reasonable because banks controlled by a 
widely held financial or nonfinancial corporation can be classified as widely held themselves (Caprio, Laeven, 
and Levine, 2007). For simplicity, we also remove banks for which the control chain is a cross-holding (five 
banks corresponding to 33 observations) since we can neither classify them as widely held banks nor as 
controlled banks.      
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4.2.2. Shareholder protection rights 
As expropriation is more likely to occur in countries with weak shareholder protection rights 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 2004), we 
conjecture that the largest controlling shareholder with excess control rights might be more 
reluctant to raise external equity and, instead, will rely more on internal and assets 
adjustments in these countries. This is because (i) control in such countries is more valuable 
for the controlling owner as he can divert significant resources and (ii) the fear of becoming a 
minority shareholder and, in turn, being subject to expropriation, is stronger.  
To represent the level of shareholder protection, we use the anti-director index as calculated 
in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008).
32
 In our sample, the index has a 
median of two and half and ranges from one (Luxembourg) with the weakest protection to 
five (Spain and the United Kingdom) with the highest level of shareholder protection. We 
define a dummy variable ShareRight that takes the value of one if the shareholder protection 
index in a given country is greater than the cross-country median value, and zero otherwise.
33
 
The estimation results are presented in Table 6. They show that banks with excess control 
rights significantly adjust their Tier 1 capital upwards when they are located in a country with 
strong shareholder protection. But such banks do not at all adjust by issuing equity when they 
are established in countries with weak shareholder protection rights. Instead, these banks 
significantly draw on their earnings and decrease their assets (particularly their loans) to 
adjust their capital ratio upwards. This result is consistent with our prediction: a higher level 
of shareholder protection rights tempers the fear of control dilution of the controlling 
shareholders with excess control rights. In countries with strong shareholder rights, banks 
with excess control rights do externally adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio upwards and do not 
rely considerably on earnings retention and downsizing.  
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 This index is obtained by adding one when: (1) shareholders are allowed to mail in their proxy votes to the 
firm; (2) shareholders are not required to deposits hares before any general shareholders’ meeting; (3) 
cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board is allowed; (4) minority shareholders 
have legal mechanisms against perceived oppression by the board; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital 
that entitles a shareholder to call for a special shareholders’ meeting is no more than 10%; or (6) shareholders 
have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. Although this index has been 
constructed at the country level from rules in place for publicly listed firms, similar disclosure requirements, 
approval procedure and facilitation of private litigation are used by owners of privately owned firms to deter 
managerial misconduct.  
33
 We are concerned by potential endogeneity between family/state ownership and the level of shareholder 
protection and therefore we check the prevalence of state and family ownership in countries with weak and 
strong shareholder protection. The proportion of observations for banks with excess control rights that have a 
family or a state as an ultimate controlling owner and that are below their target level is 44% in countries with 
relatively weak shareholder protection rights and 38% in countries with relatively strong rights.  
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4.2.3. Financial crisis  
The global financial crisis of 2008 might have influenced the way banks with excess control 
rights adjust their equity in two opposite directions. On the one hand, banks with excess 
control rights might have limited the use of external equity capital to adjust their Tier 1 capital 
ratios because the cost of raising additional capital is higher during downturns. On the other 
hand, banks controlled via excess control rights are more likely to suffer from tunneling 
during good times and to benefit from propping up during hard times (Friedman, Johnson, and 
Mitton, 2003).
34
 Hence, the ultimate controlling shareholders might have transferred funds to 
these banks during the 2008 crisis. Moreover, because of tighter supervisory scrutiny and 
market discipline during the crisis, banks with excess control rights might have been under 
pressure to adjust their capital ratio upwards even via equity issuance.  
To test the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, we define a dummy variable Crisis that 
takes the value of one if the observation is from 2008 or 2009, and zero otherwise. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 7. They show that banks with excess control rights 
do not issue any equity to adjust their Tier 1 ratio upwards during normal times. They rather 
increase their capital ratio by drawing on earnings and by shrinking their assets and 
particularly their loans. However, during the 2008 financial crisis these banks significantly 
increased their Tier 1 capital and they apparently did not draw on earnings or decrease their 
assets by cutting their loans to adjust their ratio upwards. This suggests that during the crisis, 
banks with excess control rights increased the use of external capital to adjust upwards for at 
least one of the reasons discussed above (propping up behavior and/or market/supervisory 
discipline) and as a consequence their reliance on other adjustment methods (earnings 
retention and assets adjustment) is no longer significant. 
In summary (see Table 8 for an overview of our results), the results show that the presence 
of excess control rights actually affects the way banks adjust towards the target capital ratio. 
When they are below the target, banks without excess control rights are found to adjust by 
issuing equity and by reshuffling their assets without slowing their lending and other 
activities. When they are above the target, such banks decrease their Tier 1 capital both 
                                                          
34
 Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003) define propping up (transfer of funds to the firm) as a negative 
tunneling behavior (with tunneling defined as a transfer of funds out of the firm) and assumes that the propensity 
to tunnel is highly correlated with the propensity to prop up, namely that, firms that are likely to be subject to 
tunneling during upturns are also likely to be propped up during downturns. The reason behind the propping up 
behavior is that earnings in the future, especially from profit diversion, are valuable for the controlling 
shareholders and they therefore aim to keep such firms in business and avoid their failure. This allows them to 
exploit such opportunities in the future. 
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externally and internally (by repurchasing equity and distributing more dividends) and expand 
their size and lending. This adjustment behavior -in the absence of excess control rights- is 
relatively steady across (i) owners type, (ii) weak and strong shareholder protection 
environment and (iii) normal and distress times. Turning to banks controlled by a shareholder 
with excess control rights, our results show that they do not increase their lending or reshuffle 
their assets when their capital ratio moves above the target; instead, they adjust by 
repurchasing equity possibly to strengthen their controlling power. Such a behavior is 
relatively steady across owners’ type, levels of shareholder protection rights and the state of 
the economy (normal and distress times). When they need to increase their capital ratio such 
banks do not issue equity, possibly because their ultimate controlling owners fear control 
dilution. They rather draw on earnings and shrink their assets by mainly cutting their loans. A 
closer look shows that such a behavior is only apparent during normal times in family-owned 
banks or in countries with relatively weak shareholder protection. 
Given our findings, the reluctance of banks with excess control rights to raise equity and 
their reliance on downsizing by cutting their lending might be more pronounced under the 
Basel III Accords as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 2010a) has narrowed 
the definition of Tier 1 capital to ordinary shares only. Because such banks are less able to 
adjust their Tier 1 capital by issuing equity without diluting voting rights,
35
 they might 
increase their reliance on internal adjustments and downsizing and specifically by cutting 
lending. Given their prevalence in Europe and their important contribution to the economy as 
major lenders, our findings have important policy implications.
36
 
5. Robustness checks  
We perform several regressions to check the robustness of our results
37
 obtained in Sections 
4.1 and 4.2. However, to save space we only report (see Appendix B)
38
 the robustness results 
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 Preferred shares that do not confer voting rights are no longer eligible as Tier 1 capital under the Basel III 
agreement, ordinary shares carry voting rights.  
36
 Our data indicate that banks with excess control rights are frequent in Europe; they represent around 48% of 
the controlled-banks. These banks are more focused on traditional intermediation activities (loans), and 
contribute up to 50% of the total loans granted to the economy as a whole.  
37
 For each of our robustness checks, we re-estimate the target capital ratio to compute the estimated values of 
the capital ratio surplus (kSurplus) and shortfall (kDeficit). The results, not reported here but available on 
request, are almost similar to those obtained in Table A4 in Appendix A.  
38
 Note that in all the tables, we only report the results obtained for the variables of interest. Detailed results are 






To test the robustness of our results, we run regressions on two distinct subsamples to 
differentiate banks without and with excess control rights instead of using interaction terms as 
in Eq. (6). This check leads to similar findings (see Table B1 in Appendix B).   
The period covered by our sample is limited by the availability of data on ownership in 
Bankscope and Amadeus (9 years). This might limit the effectiveness of a dynamic estimation 
procedure, namely, the use of a partial capital adjustment model as specified in Eq. (3). 
Hence, we test the robustness of our results by estimating the values of the target capital ratio 
using a perfect capital adjustment model as specified in Eq. (1).
40
 This check leaves our main 
conclusions unchanged (see Panel 1 of Table B2 in Appendix B).  
We further exclude from the initial sample banks controlled by more than one large ultimate 
shareholder (corresponding to 499 observations). The ability and the incentives of a 
controlling shareholder to expropriate and thus to protect his position might be different in the 
absence or presence of multiple controlling shareholders. The second largest shareholder 
could monitor the largest one and impede his tendency to extract private benefits of control. 
In such a case, the reluctance of the largest shareholder to issue equity (to protect his 
controlling power) and his reliance on internal funds and downsizing might be less of a 
concern. If, however, the second largest shareholder colludes with the largest one to form a 
coalition and render expropriation more efficient (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Maury 
and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008), the reluctance to issue new equity and the 
reliance on internal funds and downsizing to adjust to the target capital ratio might be more 
pronounced. This check leads again to similar findings (see Panel 2 of Table B2 in Appendix 
B).  
Since banks from Italy account for more than one third of the sample (this corresponds to 
678 observations), we run regressions without Italian banks and obtain almost similar results 
(see Panel 1 of Table B3 in Appendix B).  
We finally increase the control threshold and recalculate ownership variables with a control 
level of 20% instead of 10%. This new minimum control threshold changes our database both 
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 The robustness checks on factors affecting the relationship between the excess control rights and the 
adjustment process towards the target (Section 4.2) lead to similar conclusions and are available on request. 
40
 The Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the regressors of Eq. (1). Hence, we 





 but our main conclusions are unchanged (see Panel 2 of 
Table B3 in Appendix B).
42
   
6. Conclusion and policy implications   
The aim of this study is to empirically test whether the divergence between control and 
cash-flow rights influences banks' capital ratio adjustment behavior. For this purpose, we 
assemble a novel hand-collected data set on bank ultimate control and ownership structure 
and work on an unbalanced panel of 341 commercial banks across 17 European countries 
from 2002 to 2010.  
On the whole, the results confirm the conjecture that the bank’s decision on how to move to 
the target capital ratio is different in the presence or absence of excess control rights. On the 
one hand, when there is no divergence between both rights, we find that banks increase their 
capital ratio mainly by issuing equity and without slowing their lending activities. Such banks 
reduce their capital ratio by repurchasing equity (and distributing more dividends) but also by 
expanding their assets and particularly their lending. In such a case, there appears to be no 
fear of control dilution of the ultimate controlling shareholders. On the other hand, in the 
presence of excess control rights, banks are reluctant to issue equity to reach the target but 
more inclined to repurchase equity when they are above the target. Moreover, such banks are 
found to counterbalance their reluctance to issue equity by using internal resources and by 
shrinking their assets and particularly their lending. Furthermore, instead of expanding their 
assets when they have more equity capital than needed, they adjust by exclusively 
repurchasing equity. Our findings suggest that the ultimate controlling shareholders with 
excess control rights curb recapitalization to preserve their controlling position. Further 
investigation shows that such reluctance to issue new equity -in the presence of excess control 
rights- and the reliance on internal funds and downsizing to adjust to the target capital ratio 
hold only if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a family or when the bank is headquartered 
in a country with weak shareholder protection. However, such behavior was not apparent 
during the 2008 financial crisis: to move towards their target ratio such banks raised equity 
without reducing their assets and particularly their lending.      
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 With a threshold of 20% instead of 10%, our database comprises a higher proportion of banks considered as 
widely held and of banks controlled by another bank. The proportion of family- and state-owned banks is lower. 
More details on how our ownership variables are affected by increasing the control threshold from 10% to 20% 
are available on request.  
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 Note that we also check the robustness of our results by performing further estimations using this new control 
threshold (20%). We run all the checks performed with the data set based on a 10% threshold. In all cases, our 
main findings -not reported here and available on request- remain unchanged.   
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Our findings contribute to the capital structure adjustment literature and, by providing a 
rationale for credit crunch phenomena driven by specific governance arrangements, have 
several policy implications. We show that during the 2002-2010 period covered by the Basel I 
and II Accords, European banks with and without excess control rights behave differently 
when they increase Tier 1 regulatory capital to move to their target capital ratios. 
Consequently, it is important for regulators and supervisors to consider that imposing more 
stringent capital requirements, particularly by narrowing the definition of Tier 1 capital to 
ordinary shares, might impact banks differently depending on their ownership pattern and 
governance structure. According to our results, banks controlled by a shareholder with 
divergence between both rights are reluctant to raise equity that may dilute the voting power 
of ultimate owners. Instead, they rely on internal funds (retained earnings) and slow their 
lending. Consequently, we presume that their propensity to adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio 
through alternative methods (reducing dividend payments or shrinking assets and particularly 
loans or risk-weighted assets) might be higher under Basel III Accords because such banks 
will be less keen to dilute voting rights by issuing more ordinary shares. In the past, banks 
could strengthen their Tier 1 capital by issuing preferred shares and other types of hybrid 
capital that carried only cash-flow rights, but this is not permitted under Basel III. Hence, 
credit crunch phenomena are more likely to occur in the transition from Basel II to Basel III 
which is expected to be completed in 2019. A better disclosure of banks' ownership structures 
following the recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 
2010b) should be encouraged to improve regulatory but also market monitoring and 
discipline. Increasing the level of shareholder protection is also a solution to temper the 
aversion of controlling shareholders to external recapitalization (equity issues) and to ensure 
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Fig. 1 provides an example of a control chain of a bank (BANK). C refers to each corporation presented in each box. Arrows represent 
equity stakes held by each corporation in the bank (BANK) or in other corporations in the control chain. ControlRights and Cash-
flowRights respectively indicate voting and cash-flow rights of the three identified ultimate controlling shareholders of the bank (C6, C4 
and C5). ExcessControl is the difference between voting and cash-flow rights. Indirect voting rights are computed on the basis of the 
standard method initially proposed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), that is indirect voting rights of an ultimate 





Table 1. Statistics on the voting rights, the cash-flow rights and the excess control rights, on average, 
for the years 2004, 2006 and 2010 (control threshold of 10%) 
  
ExcessControl=0 (1,416 observations) 
 ExcessControl>0  (788 observations) 
  
ControlRights Cash-flowRights ExcessControl 
 
ControlRights Cash-flowRights ExcessControl 
Mean 
 
50.71 50.71 0 
 
80.22 36.34 43.89 
Median 
 
50.01 50.01 0 
 
98 26.17 43.25 
Standard deviation 
 
40.69 40.69 0 
 
26.62 29.25 30.40 
Minimum  0 0 0  10 0.09 0.001 
Maximum  100 100 0  100 99.74 99.41 
Subsamples definition: A bank is classified as without excess control rights (ExcessControl=0) if (i) it is controlled by an ultimate owner 
with equal voting and cash-flow rights, (ii) it is widely held or (iii) if its control chain is a cross-holding. A bank is classified as with 
excess control rights (ExcessControl>0) if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with greater voting than cash-flow rights.  
Variables definition: All variables are expressed in percentages. ControlRights=largest ultimate controlling owner’s voting rights if the 
bank is controlled, ControlRights=0 if the bank is widely held or the control chain is a cross-holding; Cash-flowRights=largest ultimate 
controlling owner’s cash-flow rights if the bank is controlled, Cash-flowRights=0 if the bank is widely held or the control chain is a 
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Table 2. Ultimate ownership type by subsamples, on average, for the years 2004, 2006 and 2010 
(control threshold of 10%) 














Bank 41.88 593 114  17.13 135 25 
Family 14.76 209 45  30.08 237 54 
State 3.39 48 10  21.95 173 44 
Institutional 7.63 108 25  16.12 127 25 
Industry 2.47 35 7  9.14 72 14 
Foundation 3.81 54 12  5.58 44 15 
WidelyHeld 23.73 336 61  - - - 
CrossHolding 2.33 33 5  - - - 
Subsamples definition: A bank is classified as without excess control rights (ExcessControl=0) if (i) it is controlled by an ultimate owner 
with equal voting and cash-flow rights, (ii) it is widely held or (iii) if its control chain is a cross-holding. A bank is classified as with 
excess control rights (ExcessControl>0) if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with greater voting than cash-flow rights.  
Variables definition: We differentiate banks according to the type of their largest ultimate controlling owner: a bank (Bank); an 
individual, a family or a manager (Family); a state or a public authority (State); a financial company, an insurance company, a mutual or 
a pension fund (Institutional); an industrial firm (Industry); a foundation or a research institute (Foundation). WidelyHeld and 





Table 3. General financial characteristics by ownership, on average, over the 2002-2010 period 
 
 Assets Loans NPL ROA ROE TotalCapital Tier1TA Tier1RWA Dividend 
 ExcessControl=0  (1,416 observations) 
Mean 86,978 58.71 3.46 0.68 8.04 13.60 7.76 11.72 0.92 
Median 4,772 61.81 2.15 0.60 8.78 12.40 6.65 10.10 1 
Standard deviation 251,000 23.02 3.81 0.88 10.63 4.69 4.37 5.48 0.27 
Minimum 57 10.03 0.05 -2.98 -48.96 8.05 1.50 4.90 0 
Maximum 2,202,423 95.94 23.61 3.32 31.44 33.78 21.83 31.70 1 
 ExcessControl>0 (788 observations) 
Mean 79,341 61.94 3.86 0.44 6.85 13.23 6.20 10.71 0.86 
Median 7,899 64.47 2.43 0.45 8.38 11.80 5.34 9.13 1 
Standard deviation 191,000 19.80 4.43 0.80 12.33 4.94 3.47 4.82 0.35 
Minimum 68 10.07 0.05 -2.93 -48.94 8.08 1.44 4.92 0 
Maximum 1,967,122 95.96 23.59 3.29 31.40 33.75 21.08 31.60 1 
T-statistics  0.74 -3.45*** -2.13** 6.19*** 2.39** 1.69* 8.64*** 4.32*** 3.21*** 
Subsamples definition: A bank is classified as without excess control rights (ExcessControl=0) if (i) it is controlled by an ultimate owner 
with equal voting and cash-flow rights, (ii) it is widely held or (iii) if its control chain is a cross-holding. A bank is classified as with 
excess control rights (ExcessControl>0) if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with greater voting than cash-flow rights.  
T-statistics test for the null: “Bank financial characteristics are not different between the subsamples of banks without and with excess 
control rights”; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for a bilateral test. 
Variables definition: All variables are expressed in percentages except Assets which is in millions of Euros and the dummy variable 
Dividend. Assets=bank’s total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total assets; NPL=ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans; 
ROA=return on assets; ROE=return on equity; TotalCapital=risk-based total capital ratio; Tier1TA=ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets; 
Tier1RWA=risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio; Dividend=a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bank pays dividend in a given 
year, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 4: Excess control rights and capital ratio adjustment (2002-2010, GMM) 
     (             )               (               )                       
         
               
           
                     
 Capital adjustment  Assets adjustment 
Dependent variable y  Tier1 RetainedEarnings Assets Loans RWA 
(1)=Tier1TA, (2)=Tier1RWA (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
kSurplus (  ) -0.07
**  -0.04* -0.04** -0.04**  0.80** 0.94** 0.43** 0.51** 0.48** 0.71** 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) 
ExcessCRkSurplus (  ) -0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.39
**  -0.49**  -0.17* -0.23** -0.28* -0.37* 
 (0.33) (0.58) (0.60) (0.66) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) 
kDeficit (   ) 0.15
** 0.09*** 0.03 0.05* -0.39 0.13 -0.35 -0.37 -0.22 -0.57** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.39) (0.09) (0.19) (0.64) (0.30) (0.10) (0.55) (0.02) 
ExcessCRkDeficit (   )  -0.10
** -0.05** 0.05*  0.03*  -0.31**   -0.84**  -0.23**  -0.29** -0.27* -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.22) 
Lagged value of y (yi,t-1) 0.03 0.02 0.40
*** 0.37*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 
(0.31) (0.59) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ExcessCR -0.48*** -0.38*** -0.12 -0.11 -0.65 -0.17 -0.55 -0.19 -0.72 -0.19 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.18) (0.22) (0.79) (0.94) (0.73) (0.89) (0.67) (0.74) 
Deposits  -0.00** -0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 -0.01 0.03** 0.02 0.00 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.86) (0.73) (0.03) (0.11) (0.96) (0.16) 
Log(Age) -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.35** -0.29* -0.28** -0.20 -0.26* -0.18 
 (0.53) (0.23) (0.74) (0.61) (0.04) (0.08) (0.01) (0.14) (0.08) (0.24) 
Rescue 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.04 1.89 1.08 1.07 0.14 0.76 0.08 
 (0.67) (0.97) (0.91) (0.55) (0.16) (0.47) (0.18) (0.86) (0.50) (0.94) 
CrossListed 0.03** 0.03*** -0.00 0.00 0.22* 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.32* -0.33 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.89) (0.94) (0.05) (0.24) (0.35) (0.44) (0.08) (0.20) 
Merger 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.41 0.66 1.42* 1.40* 0.02 1.01 
 (0.67) (0.64) (0.85) (0.79) (0.70) (0.58) (0.08) (0.09) (0.99) (0.27) 
3MInterbankRate 0.03 0.03 -0.11*** -0.11*** -2.11*** -2.37*** -1.91*** -2.09*** -1.44*** -1.59*** 
 (0.59) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDPGrowth 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 0.00 0.26** 0.24** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.15* 0.17** 
 (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.48) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.03) 
StockTraded 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.56) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27) (0.28) (0.10) (0.71) (0.14) (0.97) (0.66) 
Intercept 0.25 0.24 0.57*** 0.60*** 14.19*** 14.02*** 8.52*** 9.54*** 8.65*** 9.09*** 
 (0.28) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of observations 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 
Number of banks 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
Hansen test:        Statistic 186.69 186.67 186.17 187.00 173.76 177.29 182.07 179.22 184.71 172.10 
                            P-value (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.29) (0.23) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) (0.32) 
AR2 test:            Statistic 0.07 -0.02 -0.13 -0.05 1.15 1.24 0.73 0.63 1.19 1.16 
                            P-value (0.75) (0.78) (0.70) (0.76) (0.25) (0.21) (0.46) (0.53) (0.25) (0.16) 
Fitted target (%): Mean 7.02 11.53 7.02 11.53 7.02 11.53 7.02 11.53 7.02 11.53 
                            Maximum  14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 
                            Minimum  1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 
      -0.15
** -0.06**  -0.02 -0.03* 0.41 0.45 0.26 0.28 0.20 0.34 
Wald test (P-value) (0.02) (0.03) (0.28) (0.06) (0.44) (0.73) (0.44) (0.42) (0.41) (0.17) 
        0.05 0.04 0.08
**  0.08**  -0.70*  -0.71**  -0.58* -0.66**  -0.49*  -0.61** 
Wald test (P-value)  (0.17) (0.13) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) 
Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net 
income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net 
loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assetst + total assetst-1)/2; 
Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk- and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between the 
target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one if control rights 
are greater than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios 
when the bank is below its target, and zero otherwise; Deposits=ratio of total customer deposits to total assets; Log(Age)=natural 
logarithm of bank age; CrossListed=index equal to the number of stock markets on which the bank is listed, and zero if the bank is 
privately owned; Rescue=dummy equal to one if the bank was rescued during the 2008 financial crisis, and zero otherwise; 
Merger=dummy equal to one if the bank experienced a merger-acquisition event during the sample period, and zero otherwise; 
3MInterbankRate=three months interbank rate; GDPGrowth=real gross domestic product growth rate; StockTraded=value of listed shares 
to GDP ratio. Country and Year dummies are included but not reported. Hansen test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group; AR2 
test=second order residual autocorrelation test. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 5: Excess control rights and capital ratio adjustment: ownership type (2002-2010, GMM)    
     [                    (                   )        ]              [ 
 
   
 
         
 
       
       (  
 
   
 
         
 
     )        ]                       
         
            
                      
 Capital adjustment Assets adjustment  
Dependent variable y  Tier1 RetainedEarnings Assets Loans RWA 
(1)=Tier1TA, (2)=Tier1RWA (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
kSurplus (  ) -0.11
** -0.06** -0.07** -0.05**  0.75**  0.82**  0.31*  0.46**  0.41**  0.61**  
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
FamilykSurplus (  )  0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.14 
(0.27) (0.85) (0.21) (0.18) (0.37) (0.16) (0.26) (0.36) (0.34) (0.32) 
StatekSurplus (  ) 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.16 
(0.33) (0.89) (0.36) (0.24) (0.73) (0.21) (0.30) (0.66) (0.44) (0.58) 
ExcessCRkSurplus (  )   -0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.40 -0.39 -0.11 -0.15 -0.20 -0.29 
(0.67) (0.95) (0.12) (0.75) (0.27) (0.51) (0.88) (0.70) (0.35) (0.26) 
ExcessCRFamilykSurplus (  ) -0.06
* -0.07* 0.04* 0.01  -0.07 -0.17 -0.06 -0.16 -0.15 -0.11 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.20) (0.52) (0.20) (0.72) (0.79) (0.92) (0.40) 
ExcessCRStatekSurplus (  ) -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 -0.01 0.06 -0.15 0.03 -0.08 -0.09 -0.13 
(0.33) (0.65) (0.31) (0.14) (0.50) (0.17) (0.66) (0.28) (0.45) (0.19) 
kDeficit (   ) 0.16** 0.08*** 0.03 0.05* -0.37 0.08 -0.42 -0.39 -0.31 -0.53** 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.33) (0.08) (0.12) (0.78) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.01) 
FamilykDeficit (   ) 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.06 -0.07 0.14 -0.03 
(0.15) (0.10) (0.84) (0.47) (0.38) (0.49) (0.26) (0.81) (0.48) (0.41) 
StatekDeficit (   ) 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.06 0.03 -0.08 
(0.89) (0.36) (0.42) (0.99) (0.78) (0.61) (0.25) (0.82) (0.70) (0.40) 
ExcessCRkDeficit (   )   -0.08 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.12 -0.50 -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 
(0.24) (0.26) (0.35) (0.91) (0.20) (0.29) (0.70) (0.16) (0.48) (0.21) 
ExcessCRFamilykDeficit (   ) -0.17
** -0.10** -0.00 0.02* -0.52** -0.67**  -0.29**  -0.39**  -0.45* -0.11 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.93) (0.09) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10) 
ExcessCRStatekDeficit (   ) -0.02 0.08
** -0.05 -0.03 -0.13 -0.17 -0.12 0.11** -0.09 0.10 
(0.77) (0.03) (0.50) (0.90) (0.15) (0.22) (0.31) (0.03) (0.41) (0.11) 
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 2,171 2,171 2,171 2,171 2,171 2,171 2,171 2,171 2,171 2,171 
Number of banks 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 
Hansen test:        Statistic 182.86 182.02 179.35 176.33 186.59 187.84 188.53 186.83 185.83 183.15 
                            P-value (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.12) (0.20) 
AR2 test:             Statistic 0.19 0.10 -0.12 0.07 1.01 1.05 0.44 -0.10 1.04 1.22 
                            P-value (0.85) (0.92) (0.69) (0.95) (0.31) (0.29) (0.66) (0.60) (0.34) (0.22) 
      -0.04**  -0.05**  -0.05** -0.03* 0.89*** 0.97*** 0.49**  0.58** 0.57** 0.75*** 
Wald test (P-value) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
      -0.04
* -0.07**  -0.08**  -0.04**  0.79**  1.02*** 0.37** 0.54** 0.49**  0.77*** 
Wald test (P-value) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
      -0.15
** -0.06**  -0.08**  -0.06* 0.35 0.43 0.20 0.31 0.21 0.32 
Wald test (P-value) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.54) (0.30) (0.79) (0.56) (0.18) (0.16) 
            -0.14
**  -0.12**  -0.02 -0.03 0.42 0.41 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.35 
Wald test (P-value) (0.02) (0.03) (0.49) (0.21) (0.18) (0.47) (0.67) (0.50) (0.34) (0.29) 
            -0.10
**  -0.09**  -0.19**  -0.06**  0.45 0.48 0.29 0.31 0.20 0.35 
Wald test (P-value) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.15) (0.25) (0.53) (0.43) (0.30) (0.19) 
        0.27
*** 0.15*** 0.04 0.06* -0.31 0.15 -0.36 -0.46 -0.17 -0.56** 
Wald test (P-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.09) (0.17) (0.58) (0.26) (0.13) (0.32) (0.01) 
        0.18
*** 0.05** -0.01 0.05* -0.34 0.12 -0.36 -0.45 -0.28 -0.61*** 
Wald test (P-value) (0.00) (0.04) (0.67) (0.10) (0.15) (0.63) (0.25) (0.15) (0.21) (0.00) 
        0.08
** 0.06**  0.07* 0.05*  -0.49 -0.42 -0.48 -0.49*  -0.36 -0.58** 
Wald test (P-value)  (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.18) (0.14) (0.25) (0.09) (0.49) (0.04) 
                0.02 0.03 0.08
** 0.08** -0.95**  -1.02** -0.71**  -0.95** -0.67**  -0.72** 
Wald test (P-value)  (0.71) (0.59) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
                0.08
**  0.11*** -0.02 0.02 -0.59* -0.55* -0.54 -0.44 -0.42 -0.56 
Wald test (P-value) (0.02) (0.00) (0.67) (0.39) (0.10) (0.07) (0.17) (0.19) (0.37) (0.14) 
Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net income 
less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net loans/average 
assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assetst + total assetst-1)/2; Tier1TA and Tier1RWA 
are respectively nonrisk- and risk-based target Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 
ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; Family=dummy equal to one if the bank is family-controlled, and zero otherwise; 
State=dummy equal to one if the bank is state-controlled, and zero otherwise; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one if control rights are greater than 
cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below 
its target, and zero otherwise. In addition to Family and State dummies, the regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 4 (see 
their definition in Table A5 in Appendix A). Country and Year dummies are included but not reported. Detailed results are available on request. 
Hansen test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group; AR2 test=second order residual autocorrelation test. P-values based on robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 6: Excess control rights and capital ratio adjustment: shareholder protection (2002-2010, GMM)    
     [                (               )        ]              [ 
 
   
 
            ( 
 
   
                     )        ]                       
         
            
                      
 Capital adjustment  Assets adjustment  
Dependent variable y  Tier1 RetainedEarnings Assets Loans RWA 
(1)=Tier1TA, (2)=Tier1RWA (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
kSurplus (  )  -0.08
** -0.07*  -0.06** -0.06*** 0.72**  0.89** 0.33*  0.43**  0.39**  0.62**  
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) 
ShareRightkSurplus (  ) 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.18 
 (0.10) (0.22) (0.29) (0.24) (0.59) (0.19) (0.56) (0.73) (0.89) (0.28) 
ExcessCRkSurplus (  )  -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.36 -0.48 -0.04 -0.17 -0.18 -0.29 
 (0.65) (0.90) (0.15) (0.17) (0.39) (0.69) (0.50) (0.74) (0.70) (0.19) 
ExcessCRShareRightkSurplus (  ) 0.06 0.02 -0.03 -0.06* -0.07 -0.02 -0.18 0.07 -0.17 -0.16 
 (0.72) (0.53) (0.14) (0.10) (0.78) (0.78) (0.19) (0.97) (0.10) (0.11) 
kDeficit (   ) 0.16** 0.07** 0.04 0.04* -0.35 -0.09 -0.37 -0.29 -0.19 -0.59**  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.45) (0.08) (0.17) (0.64) (0.17) (0.11) (0.51) (0.01) 
ShareRightkDeficit (   ) 0.06 0.08 0.01 -0.00 -0.10 0.17 -0.05 -0.27 -0.08 -0.03 
 (0.41) (0.11) (0.79) (0.98) (0.92) (0.17) (0.93) (0.34) (0.21) (0.43) 
ExcessCRkDeficit (   ) -0.14** -0.06**  0.04*  0.02* -0.49**  -0.85**  -0.48*  -0.61**  -0.47* -0.08 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.36) 
ExcessCRShareRightkDeficit (   ) -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.34 0.27 0.47*  0.58*  0.43 0.13 
 (0.95) (1.00) (0.60) (0.54) (0.51) (0.38) (0.07) (0.07) (0.46) (0.48) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 
Number of banks 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
Hansen test:         Statistic 286.92 297.53 299.88 292.30 285.67 274.06 291.92 295.23 285.48 279.29 
                             P-value (0.31) (0.18) (0.15) (0.24) (0.33) (0.52) (0.24) (0.20) (0.33) (0.43) 
AR2 test:              Statistic 0.12 0.02 -0.15 0.06 1.14 1.24 0.69 0.57 1.25 1.28 
                             P-value (0.90) (0.98) (0.88) (0.95) (0.25) (0.21) (0.49) (0.57) (0.15) (0.15) 
Fitted target (%): Mean 7.02 11.53 7.02 11.53 7.02 11.53 7.02 11.53 7.02 11.53 
                             Maximum  14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 
                             Minimum  1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 
      -0.06
**  -0.04* -0.08**  -0.05**  0.87*** 0.97*** 0.48**   0.57**  0.55**  0.80** 
Wald test (P-value)  (0.04) (0.10) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
      -0.16
**  -0.09**  -0.01 -0.02 0.36 0.41 0.29 0.26 0.21 0.33 
Wald test (P-value) (0.05) (0.04) (0.81) (0.25) (0.43) (0.41) (0.43) (0.55) (0.39) (0.13) 
            -0.08
**  -0.04**  -0.06** -0.07** 0.44* 0.47* 0.26 0.33 0.20 0.35 
Wald test (P-value) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.56) (0.19) (0.42) (0.20) 
        0.22*** 0.15*** 0.05 0.04 -0.45 0.08 -0.42 -0.56 -0.27 -0.62**  
Wald test (P-value)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.12) (0.14) (64) (0.13) (0.11) (0.37) (0.01) 
        0.02 0.01 0.08
**  0.06**  -0.84** -0.94**  -0.90**  -0.90**  -0.66**  -0.67**  
Wald test (P-value)  (0.64) (0.73) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
                0.08
**  0.09*** 0.05* 0.03 -0.60* -0.50* -0.43 -0.59 -0.31 -0.57* 
Wald test (P-value)  (0.04) (0.00) (0.06) (0.14) (0.07) (0.10) (0.21) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08) 
Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net 
income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net 
loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assetst + total assetst-1)/2; 
Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk- and risk-based target Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between 
the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; ShareRight=dummy equal to one if the 
shareholder protection index is greater than the median value, and zero otherwise; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one if control rights are 
greater than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when 
the bank is below its target, and zero otherwise. The regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 4 (see their definition in 
Table A5 in Appendix A). Country and Year dummies are included but not reported. Detailed results are available on request. Hansen 
test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group; AR2 test=second order residual autocorrelation test. P-values based on robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 7: Excess control rights and capital ratio adjustment: 2008 financial crisis (2002-2010, GMM) 
     [            (           )        ]              [ 
 
   
 
        ( 
 
            ) 
               ]                       
         
            
                       
 Capital adjustment   Assets adjustment  
Dependent variable y  Tier1 RetainedEarnings Assets Loans RWA 
(1)=Tier1TA, (2)=Tier1RWA (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
kSurplus (  )  -0.09
*** -0.06** -0.04** -0.05**  1.08**  1.15*** 0.53**  0.63**  0.61**  0.91** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
CrisiskSurplus (  )  0.05*  0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.62 -0.45 -0.20 -0.28 -0.30 -0.40 
 (0.07) (0.49) (0.13) (0.12) (0.75) (0.67) (0.71) (0.59) (0.12) (0.27) 
ExcessCRkSurplus (  )  -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.62 -0.65 -0.17 -0.29 -0.32 -0.54 
 (0.51) (0.50) (0.61) (0.16) (0.77) (0.47) (0.50) (0.80) (0.42) (0.45) 
ExcessCRCrisiskSurplus (  ) 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.50 0.35 0.06 0.16 0.22 0.37 
 (0.63) (0.25) (0.92) (0.65) (0.23) (0.41) (0.88) (0.70) (0.80) (0.28) 
kDeficit  (   )  0.16
** 0.12** 0.04 0.06 -0.43 0.07 -0.24 -0.32 -0.25 -0.65**  
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.17) (0.10) (0.28) (0.85) (0.73) (0.35) (0.12) (0.02) 
CrisiskDeficit (   )  -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.18 -0.21 -0.14 -0.18 0.18 
 (0.39) (0.85) (0.21) (0.19) (0.51) (0.66) (0.75) (0.59) (0.22) (0.80) 
ExcessCRkDeficit (   )  -0.12* -0.10* 0.06 0.06* -0.50* -0.96** -0.42* -0.51* -0.48** -0.15 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.16) (0.06) (0.08) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.82) 
ExcessCRCrisiskDeficit (   )  0.10 0.10 -0.04 -0.05 0.47 0. 20 0.43 0.51 0.62 0.33 
 (0.24) (0.17) (0.43) (0.73) (0.15) (0.44) (0.24) (0.38) (0.12) (0.29) 
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204  2,204  
Number of banks 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
Hansen test:       Statistic 196.48 188.16 193.55 204.38 179.66 182.09 185.55 214.86 186.52 184.56 
                           P-value (0.17) (0.14) (0.09) (0.13) (0.26) (0.22) (0.17) (0.11) (0.16) (0.18) 
AR2 test:            Statistic 0.13 0.11 -0.12 0.10 1.26 1.23 0.72 0.51 1.08 1.06 
                           P-value (0.90) (0.89) (0.90) (0.80) (0.21) (0.22) (0.47) (0.61) (0.34) (0.35) 
Fitted target (%):Mean 7.02 11.53 7.02 11.53 7.02 11.53 7.02 11.53 7.02 11.53 
                            Maximum  14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 
                            Minimum  1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 
      -0.04
* -0.03 -0.06** -0.06** 0.46* 0.70**  0.33 0.35  0.31  0.51** 
Wald test (P-value)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01) (0.09) (0.04) (0.55) (0.57) (0.45) (0.05)  
      -0.13
**  -0.09**  -0.03 -0.02 0.46 0.50 0.36 0.34 0.29 0.37 
Wald test (P-value) (0.01) (0.02) (0.60) (0.14) (0.13) (0.43) (0.50) (0.66) (0.54) (0.32) 
            -0.04 -0.03
*  -0.07**  -0.06**  0.34 0.40 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.34 
Wald test (P-value) (0.16) (0.09) (0.03) (0.01) (0.73) (0.69) (0.72) (0.71) (0.62) (0.73) 
        0.10** 0.06**  0.03 0.04 -0.49 0.25 -0.45 -0.46 -0.43 -0.47* 
Wald test (P-value)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.20) (0.12) (0.25) (0.51) (0.31) (0.29) (0.47) (0.08) 
        0.04 0.02 0.10
*** 0.12**  -0.93**  -0.89**  -0.66**  -0.83**  -0.73**  -0.80**  
Wald test (P-value)  (0.21) (0.32) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                0.08
** 0.06** 0.05 0.05 -0.52 -0.51 -0.44 -0.46 -0.29 -0.29 
Wald test (P-value)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.36) (0.53) (0.23) (0.40) (0.16) (0.47) (0.15) (0.20) 
Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net 
income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net 
loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assetst + total assetst-1)/2; 
Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk- and risk-based target Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between 
the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; Crisis=dummy equal to one if the observation 
is from 2008 or 2009, and zero otherwise; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one if control rights are greater than cash-flow rights, and zero 
otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below its target, and zero 
otherwise. The regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 4 (see their definition in Table A5 in Appendix A). Country and 
Year dummies are included but not reported. Detailed results are available on request. Hansen test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a 
group; AR2 test=second order residual autocorrelation test. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** 




Table 8. Excess control rights and capital ratio adjustment: a summary of results  
 When banks are above the target capital ratio 
 
When banks are below the target capital ratio 




Assets Loans RWA Equity 
Retained 
earnings 
Assets Loans RWA 











Effects are similar across (i) ownership type and (ii) level of shareholder 
protection and hold during normal times 
Effects during distress times:    
Effects are steady across (i) ownership type; (ii) level of shareholder of 
protection; and (iii) normal and distress times 
 
 
→ ↓ ↑ → ↑ 















↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Effects are similar across (i) ownership type and (ii) level of shareholder of 
protection and hold during normal times. 
Effects during distress times: 
Effects only hold for: (i) family-controlled banks; (ii) countries with relatively 
weak shareholder protection; (iii) normal times 
Otherwise, the effects are like in the absence of excess control rights:  
→ ↓ → → → ↑ → → → ↓ 
↑, ↓ and → respectively denote an increase, a decrease and a non-significance. Capital adjustment refers to adjustment through capital either externally (equity issue or repurchase) or internally (retained 
















Table A1. Distribution of European commercial banks and representativeness of the final sample  
Country   All Banks  Listed Banks  Percent of total assets 
Austria  9  2  39.19 
Belgium  8  0  97.56 
Denmark  43  33  93.75 
Finland  2  0  85.79 
France  18  6  74.74 
Germany  22  7  74.52 
Greece  10  9  94.84 
Ireland  11  5  94.14 
Italy  99  18  81.49 
Luxembourg  14  3  50.06 
Netherlands  17  4  61.04 
Norway  7  3  73.53 
Portugal  9  2  81.39 
Spain  16  9  87.24 
Sweden  9  2  83.02 
Switzerland  12  3  87.17 
United Kingdom  35  5  71.44 
Total/Mean  341  111  78.28 
Percent of total assets=percentage of total assets of our sample banks in a given country in the aggregate total assets of all 








Table A2. General descriptive statistics of the final sample (341 banks), on average, over the 2002-
2010 period  
 Assets Deposits Loans LoanlossProv TotalCapital Tier1TA Tier1RWA ROA ROE 
Mean 84,248 47.79 60.78 0.72 13.47 7.20 11.35 0.59 7.62 
Median 5,926 48.45 63.87 0.47 12.20 6.07 9.72 0.54 8.64 
Standard deviation 231,000 22.70 21.06 1.00 4.78 4.14 5.27 0.86 11.28 
Minimum 57 3.88 10.03 -0.74 8.05 1.44 4.90 -2.98 -48.96 
Maximum 2,202,423 91.96  95.96 5.65 33.78 21.83 31.70 3.32 31.44 
Variables definition: All variables are expressed in percentages except Assets which is in millions of Euros. Assets=bank’s total 
assets; Deposits=ratio of total customer deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total assets; LoanlossProv=ratio of loan 
loss provisions to net loans; TotalCapital=risk-based total capital ratio; Tier1TA=nonrisk-based Tier 1 capital ratio; Tier1RWA=risk-
based Tier 1 capital ratio; ROA=return on assets; ROE=return on equity.  
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Table A3. Description of the control variables used to estimate the target capital ratio and their descriptive statistics, on average, over the period 
2002-2010.  
Variable Description Expected 
sign 
Authors Mean* Standard 
deviation  
Minimum Maximum Number of 
Observations  
ExcessCR Dummy variable equal to one if 
voting rights are greater than cash-
flow rights, and zero otherwise 
(-) Brewer III, Kaufman, and 
Wall (2008) 
0.36 0.48 0 1 2,204 
Log(Assets) Bank size measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets (Millions of 
Euros) 
(-) Nier and Baumann (2006); 
Brewer III, Kaufman, and 
Wall (2008); Flannery and 
Rangan (2008) 
8.84 2.41 3.83 14.61 2,204 
ROA Bank profitability measured by the 
return on assets (%) 
(+/-) Marcus (1983); Ayuso, Pérez, 
and Saurina (2004); Flannery 
and Rangan (2008) 
0.59 0.86 -2.98 3.31 2,204 
LoanlossProv Bank risk measured by the ratio of 
loan loss provisions to net loans (%) 
(+/-) Ayuso, Pérez, and Saurina 
(2004); Nier and Baumann 
(2006); Jokipii and Milne 
(2008) 
0.72 1 -0.74 5.65 2,204 
Loans Bank business model measured by 
the ratio of net loans to total assets 
(%) 
(-) Ayuso, Pérez, and Saurina 
(2004) 
60.78 21.06 10.03 95.96 2,204 
MarketDiscipline Market discipline measured by the 
ratio of total long term market 
funding to total funding (%) 
(+) Nier and Baumann (2006) 24.16 24.98 0.08 84.07 2,204 
Listed Dummy variable equal to one if the 
bank is listed, and zero otherwise 
(-) Shehzad, de Haan, and 
Scholtens (2010) 
0.39 0.49 0 1 2,204 
GDPGrowth Business cycle measured by the real 
GDP (Growth Domestic Product) 
growth rate (%)  
(+/-) Ayuso, Pérez, and Saurina 
(2004); Nier and Baumann 
(2006); Jokipii and Milne 
(2008) 
1.28 2.73 -8.20 6.64 2,204 





Table A4. Estimating the target capital ratio using a partial adjustment model for European commercial 
banks (2002-2010) 
     (   )        (                          
                  )       
 Full sample Subsamples 
 Baseline 
Excess control rights 
differentiated target 
Baseline for ExcessControl=0 Baseline for ExcessControl>0 
Dependent variable k   Tier1TA Tier1RWA Tier1TA Tier1RWA Tier1TA Tier1RWA Tier1TA Tier1RWA 
Lagged value of k (ki,t-1) 0.59
*** 0.66*** 0.60*** 0.66*** 0.57*** 0.67*** 0.56*** 0.35*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ExcessCR   -0.33**  -0.73***     
   (0.04) (0.00)     
Log(Assets) -0.51*** -0.56*** -0.51*** -0.57*** -0.04 -0.04 -0.42*** -0.41*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA 0.48*** 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.54*** 0.59*** 0.69*** 0.27*** 0.45*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LoanlossProv 0.19*** 0.16** 0.19*** 0.16** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.18*** -0.07 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) 
Loans -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.00 -0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) 
MarketDiscipline 0.00** 0.01** 0.00** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) 
Listed  -0.70*** -1.45*** -0.67*** -1.41*** -0.22* -0.09 -0.44*** -0.51*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.61) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDPGrowth -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03**  -0.05**  0.03*** 0.02** 
 (0.64) (0.29) (0.61) (0.28) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) 
Intercept 5.12*** 7.77*** 5.14*** 7.84*** 5.93** 6.95*** 5.94*** 10.20*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 1,416 1,416 788 788 
Number of banks 341 341 341 341 236 236 154 154 
Hansen test: Statistic 135.59 117 135.24 117.38 132.61 131.18 115.20 112.92 
                     P-value (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) 
AR2 test:      Statistic 0.93 -1.01 0.93 -0.99 0.34 -0.74 1.04 -0.63 
                     P-value (0.35) (0.31) (0.35) (0.32) (0.73) (0.46) (0.30) (0.53) 
This table shows the results of estimating the target capital ratio using the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
for: (i) the baseline specification (Baseline) without the dummy variable ExcessCR; (ii) the augmented specification including a dummy 
variable ExcessCR (Excess control rights differentiated target); and (iii) the baseline specification estimated separately for the subsamples of 
banks without (ExcessControl=0) and with (ExcessControl>0) excess control rights.  
Subsamples definition: A bank is classified as without excess control rights (ExcessControl=0) if (i) it is controlled by an ultimate owner with 
equal voting and cash-flow rights, (ii) it is widely held or (iii) if its control chain is a cross-holding. A bank is classified as with excess control 
rights (ExcessControl>0) if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with greater voting than cash-flow rights.  
Variables definition: Tier1TA=nonrisk-based Tier 1 capital ratio; Tier1RWA=risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one 
if voting rights are greater than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; Log(Assets)=natural logarithm of total assets; ROA=return on assets; 
LoanlossProv=ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; Loans=ratio of net loans to total assets; MarketDiscipline=total long term market 
funding to total funding ratio; Listed=dummy equal to one if the bank is listed, and zero otherwise; GDPGrowth=real GDP (Growth Domestic 
Product) growth rate. Hansen test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group; AR2 test=second order residual autocorrelation test. P-




Table A5: Description of the variables used in Eq. (6) and their Summary statistics, on average, over the 2002-2010 period 
Variable Definition and source*   Mean** Standard  
deviation  
Minimum Maximum Number of  
observations  
Tier1  Annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings, all divided by average total assets
*** (%) 0.41 1.42 -4.73 10.62 2,204 
RetainedEarnings Net income less dividend paid both measured at time t, all divided by average total assets (%)   0.45 0.85 -3.17 3.23 2,204  
Assets Annual change in total assets divided by average total assets (%)  8.48 14.81 -50.64 72.82 2,204 
Loans Annual change in net loans (excluding interbank loans) divided by average total assets (%)  6.18 10.16 -33.65 48.22 2,204 
RWA Annual change in risk-weighted assets divided by average total assets (%)   4.60 13.16 -45.88 70.58 2,204  
kSurplus Absolute value of the gap between the fitted target and the lagged actual Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its 
target capital ratio, and zero otherwise; the target and the lagged actual Tier 1 ratios are computed based on the 
risk-based Tier 1 ratio (%)     
1.38 2.34 0 8.27 2,204 
 Absolute value of the gap between the fitted target and the lagged actual Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its 
target capital ratio, and zero otherwise; the target and the lagged actual Tier 1 ratios are computed based on the 
nonrisk based Tier 1 ratio (%)  
1.02 1.56 0 5.48 2,204 
kDeficit Absolute value of the gap between the fitted target and the lagged actual Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below its 
target capital ratio, and zero otherwise; the target and the lagged actual Tier 1 ratios are computed based on the 
risk-based Tier 1 ratio (%)    
1.96 2.61 0 10.91 2,204 
  Absolute value of the gap between the fitted target and the lagged actual Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below its 
target capital ratio, and zero otherwise; the target and the lagged actual Tier 1 ratios are computed based on the 
nonrisk based Tier 1 ratio (%)  
0.97 1.45 0 6.34 2,204 
ExcessCR Dummy variable equal to one if voting rights are greater than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise. Source: 
Bankscope, Amadeus, annual reports  
0.36 0.48 0 1 2,204 
Deposits  Customer deposits to total assets ratio (%)  47.79 22.70 3.88 91.96 2,204 
Log(Age) Natural logarithm of bank age (years) 3.73 1.22 0 6.29 2,204 
Rescue  Dummy variable equal to one if the bank was rescued during the 2008 financial crisis, and zero otherwise. Source: 
Petrovic and Tutsch (2009)  
0.10 0.30 0 1 2,204  
Merger  Dummy variable equal to one if the bank experienced a merger-acquisition event during the sample period, and 
zero otherwise. Source: Thomson Reuters Advanced Analytics database  
0.09 0.29 0 1 2,204 
CrossListed Index equal to the number of stock markets on which the bank is listed, and zero if the bank is privately owned 1.63 3.18 0 16 2,204 
3MInterbankRate  3-month interbank rate (%). Source: Bloomberg database  2.57 1.34 0.11 6.34 2,204 
GDPGrowth  Real gross domestic product growth rate (%).Source: Bloomberg database     1.28 2.73 -8.20 6.64 2,204 
StockTraded  Value of listed shares to GDP ratio (%). Source: World Development Indicators (The World Bank)   77.40 58.28 0.33 394.60 2,204 
*All variables are retrieved from Bankscope database, unless otherwise indicated.  
** Note that we report summary statistics for variables measured at time t.     






Table B1. Excess control rights and capital ratio adjustment: regressions using subsamples of banks 
without and with excess control rights (2002-2010, GMM) 
                                               
         
            
                      
 Capital adjustment Assets adjustment 
Dependent variable y Tier1 RetainedEarnings Assets Loans RWA 
(1)=Tier1TA, (2)=Tier1RWA (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Panel 1: ExcessControl=0    
kSurplus (  )   -0.06
**  -0.03* -0.04** -0.03** 0.75**  0.90**  0.46**  0.50**  0.42**  0.66**  
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
kDeficit (   )   0.15
*** 0.12*** 0.03 0.04* -0.43 0.17 -0.35 -0.31 -0.19 -0.47** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.08) (0.24) (0.59) (0.31) (0.15) (0.59) (0.03) 
Control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 
Number of banks 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 
Hansen test:       Statistic 98.05 95.15 98.40 93.17 99.63 92.30 98.19 92.06 95.54 97.27 
                           P-value (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
AR2 test:            Statistic 0.15 -0.12 -0.17 0.16 0.50 0.54 -0.12 -0.06 1.08 1.20 
                           P-value (0.86) (0.89) (0.86) (0.80) (0.62) (0.59) (0.90) (0.95) (0.28) (0.23) 
Fitted target (%):Mean 7.04 11.70 7.04 11.70 7.04 11.70 7.04 11.70 7.04 11.70 
                           Maximum  15.73 24.46 15.73 24.46 15.73 24.46 15.73 24.46 15.73 24.46 
                           Minimum  1.61 4.89 1.61 4.89 1.61 4.89 1.61 4.89 1.61 4.89 
Panel 2: ExcessControl>0   
kSurplus (  )   -0.14
** -0.07** -0.04 -0.03 0.40 0.39 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.38 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.28) (0.14) (0.39) (0.86) (0.35) (0.65) (0.39) (0.17) 
kDeficit (   )   0.05 0.02 0.07
** 0.04** -0.74**  -0.74**  -0.60** -0.75** -0.50* -0.65**  
 (0.25) (0.36) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) 
Control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 788 788 788 788 788 788 788 788 788  788  
Number of banks 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Hansen test:         Statistic 107.63 93.39 92.13 84.93 96.90 97.53 89.19 99.63 93.56 93.87 
                             P-value (0.14) (0.23) (0.25) (0.45) (0.16) (0.15) (0.33) (0.12) (0.22) (0.22) 
AR2 test:             Statistic 1.17 1.12 -0.33 -0.24 1.21 1.34 1.06 1.10 1.14 1.60 
                             P-value (0.24) (0.26) (0.74) (0.81) (0.23) (0.18) (0.24) (0.24) (0.18) (0.11) 
Fitted target (%): Mean 6.49 10.14 6.49 10.14 6.49 10.14 6.49 10.14 6.49 10.14 
                             Maximum  12.67 19.76 12.67 19.76 12.67 19.76 12.67 19.76 12.67 19.76 
                             Minimum  2.31 5.98 2.31 5.98 2.31 5.98 2.31 5.98 2.31 5.98 
Subsamples definition: A bank is classified as without excess control rights (ExcessControl=0) if (i) it is controlled by an ultimate owner 
with equal voting and cash-flow rights, (ii) it is widely held or (iii) if its control chain is a cross-holding. A bank is classified as with 
excess control rights (ExcessControl>0) if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with greater voting than cash-flow rights.  
Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net 
income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in 
net loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assetst  + total assetst-1)/2; 
Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk- and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between the 
target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the 
target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below its target, and zero otherwise. The regressions contain the same control 
variables (except ExcessCR) as in Table 4 (see their definition in Table A5 in Appendix A). Country and Year dummies are included but 
not reported. Detailed results are available on request. Hansen test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group; AR2 test=second 
order residual autocorrelation test. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table B2: Excess control rights and capital ratio adjustment (2002-2010, GMM) 
     (             )               (               )                       
         
        
           
                      
 Capital adjustment  Assets adjustment  
Dependent variable y  Tier1 RetainedEarnings Assets Loans RWA 
(1)=Tier1TA, (2)=Tier1RWA  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Panel 1: Fitted values of the target are obtained using a perfect adjustment model 
kSurplus (  )  -0.06
* -0.04* -0.05**  -0.04**  0.77**  0.90**  0.45**  0.54**  0.48**  0.70**  
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ExcessCRkSurplus (  )   -0.08 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.36
**  -0.45**  -0.19* -0.30**  -0.28* -0.37* 
 (0.43) (0.70) (0.47) (0.79) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) 
kDeficit (   )  0.16** 0.12*** 0.03 0.03 -0.36 0.06 -0.35 -0.38 -0.22 -0.60*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.41) (0.19) (0.20) (0.89) (0.29) (0.13) (0.51) (0.01) 
ExcessCRkDeficit (   )    -0.11
* -0.09** 0.04 0.04**  -0.40**  -0.76**  -0.26**  -0.25** -0.32* -0.04 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.37) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.49) 
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204  2,204  
Number of banks 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
Hansen test:       Statistic 189.99 179.18 182.24 183.11 179.71 181.85 186.42 187.86 181.80 165.23 
                           P-value (0.10) (0.20) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.46) 
AR2 test:            Statistic 0.08 -0.06 -0.02 0.05 1.18 1.16 0.87 0.70 1.06 1.09 
                           P-value (0.94) (0.95) (0.89) (0.96) (0.24) (0.25) (0.38) (0.49) (0.14) (0.15) 
Fitted target (%):Mean 6.97 10.88 6.97 10.88 6.97 10.88 6.97 10.88 6.97 10.88 
                           Maximum  15.10 21.49 15.10 21.49 15.10 21.49 15.10 21.49 15.10 21.49 
                           Minimum  1.15  4.36 1.15  4.36 1.15  4.36 1.15  4.36 1.15  4.36 
      -0.14
**  -0.06**  -0.02 -0.03* 0.41 0.45 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.33 
Wald test (P-value) (0.03) (0.02) (0.27) (0.08) (0.23) (0.32) (0.42) (0.75) (0.50) (0.15) 
        0.05 0.03 0.07**  0.07**  -0.76**  -0.70**  -0.61**  -0.63** -0.54* -0.64**  
Wald test (P-value)  (0.12) (0.25) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) 
Panel2: Excluding banks controlled by more than one large ultimate shareholder 
kSurplus (  )  -0.06
* -0.04* -0.06** -0.05** 0.76**  0.88**  0.47**  0.47**  0.53**  0.64**  
(0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
ExcessCRkSurplus (  )   -0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.42
**  -0.48* -0.20* -0.23**  -0.35* -0.30* 
(0.34) (0.29) (0.50) (0.78) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
kDeficit (   )  0.15** 0.10*** 0.04 0.04* -0.34 0.08 -0.36 -0.36 -0.23 -0.63** 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.13) (0.10) (0.24) (0.82) (0.21) (0.11) (0.52) (0.02) 
ExcessCRkDeficit (   )    -0.11
* -0.06* 0.04**  0.02*  -0.37** -0.79**  -0.27**  -0.30**  -0.29* -0.02 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.28) 
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 1,705 1,705 1,705 1,705 1,705 1,705 1,705 1,705 1,705 1,705  
Number of banks 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 
Hansen test:       Statistic 186.49 184.17 181.45 181.39 177.27 173.45 179.24 183.85 182.56 163.21 
                           P-value (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.17) (0.23) (0.29) (0.20) (0.16) (0.15) (0.50) 
AR2 test:            Statistic -0.13 -0.09 -0.17 0.11 0.36 0.46 0.11 0.12 1.00 0.95 
                           P-value (0.89) (0.93) (0.86) (0.90) (0.72) (0.65) (0.90) (0.91) (0.15) (0.15) 
Fitted target (%):Mean 6.89 11.34 6.89 11.34 6.89 11.34 6.89 11.34 6.89 11.34 
                            Maximum  14.66 23.60 14.66 23.60 14.66 23.60 14.66 23.60 14.66 23.60 
                            Minimum  1.15 4.17 1.15 4.17 1.15 4.17 1.15 4.17 1.15 4.17 
      -0.13
**  -0.08**  -0.03 -0.03* 0.34 0.40 0.27 0.24 0.18 0.34 
Wald test (P-value) (0.01) (0.04) (0.23) (0.07) (0.36) (0.60) (0.52) (0.54) (0.50) (0.18) 
        0.04 0.04 0.08**  0.06**  -0.71** -0.71**  -0.63**  -0.66**  -0.52**  -0.65**  
Wald test (P-value)  (0.27) (0.15) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net 
income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net 
loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assetst + total assetst-1)/2; 
Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk- and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between the 
target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one if control rights 
are greater than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios 
when the bank is below its target, and zero otherwise. The regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 4 (see their definition 
in Table A5 in Appendix A). Country and Year dummies are included but not reported. Detailed results are available on request. Hansen 
test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group; AR2 test=second order residual autocorrelation test. P-values based on robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table B3: Excess control rights and capital ratio adjustment (2002-2010, GMM) 
     (             )               (               )                       
         
        
            
                      
 Capital adjustment  Assets adjustment  
Dependent variable y  Tier1 RetainedEarnings Assets Loans RWA 
(1)=Tier1TA, (2)=Tier1RWA  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Panel 1: Excluding Italian banks 
kSurplus (  )  -0.06
* -0.04* -0.04**  -0.04** 0.88**  0.96**  0.41**  0.53**  0.48**  0.66**  
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) 
ExcessCRkSurplus (  )   -0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.44
** -0.48** -0.13* -0.25**  -0.27** -0.34* 
 (0.14) (0.34) (0.78) (0.60) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) 
kDeficit (   )  0.16*** 0.11*** 0.02 0.04* -0.36 0.16 -0.34 -0.40 -0.25 -0.56** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.59) (0.09) (0.16) (0.57) (0.34) (0.11) (0.50) (0.02) 
ExcessCRkDeficit (   )    -0.12
*** -0.07* 0.05* 0.03*  -0.29*  -0.88**  -0.28**  -0.29**  -0.25* -0.05 
 (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.33) 
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526  
Number of banks 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242  
Hansen test:         Statistic 182.85 186.45 180.47 177.67 176.58 171.89 185.94 185.79 174.78 168.05 
                             P-value (0.15) (0.11) (0.18) (0.22) (0.24) (0.32) (0.12) (0.15) (0.27) (0.40) 
AR2 test:              Statistic -0.85 -0.92 -0.31 0.10 0.62 0.76 0.78 0.93 1.49 1.45 
                             P-value (0.40) (0.36) (0.75) (0.19) (0.54) (0.45) (0.44) (0.35) (0.35) (0.25) 
Fitted target (%): Mean 7.06 12.07 7.06 12.07 7.06 12.07 7.06 12.07 7.06 12.07 
                             Maximum  14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 14.92 24.87 
                             Minimum  1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 1.70 4.08 
      -0.14
**  -0.07** -0.02 -0.02* 0.44 0.48 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.32 
Wald test (P-value) (0.02) (0.01) (0.37) (0.07) (0.38) (0.68) (0.45) (0.40) (0.35) (0.16) 
        0.04 0.04 0.07
**  0.07**  -0.65**  -0.72**  -0.62**  -0.69**  -0.50* -0.61**  
Wald test (P-value)  (0.23) (0.12) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
Panel 2: Control threshold of 20% 
kSurplus (  )  -0.06
**  -0.04* -0.05** -0.03* 0.81**  0.94**  0.42**  0.54** 0.46**  0.70**  
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
ExcessCRkSurplus (  )   -0.09
* -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.38**  -0.47* -0.20* -0.25**  -0.21* -0.37* 
 (0.07) (0.46) (0.77) (0.63) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
kDeficit (   )  0.16
*** 0.10*** 0.03 0.04* -0.38 0.12 -0.29 -0.34 -0.28 -0.55** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.28) (0.06) (0.20) (0.68) (0.38) (0.12) (0.42) (0.02) 
ExcessCRkDeficit (   )    -0.13
*** -0.07*** 0.06* 0.03* -0.30**  -0.84**  -0.29* -0.33**  -0.26*  -0.05 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.30) 
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204  
Number of banks 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
Hansen test:         Statistic 183.84 183.32 187.45 191.22 166.28 172.51 183.90 180.20 181.67 180.26 
                             P-value (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.50) (0.37) (0.18) (0.14) (0.19) (0.23) 
AR2 test:             Statistic 0.33 -0.30 -0.21 -0.30 1.23 1.27 0.77 0.68 1.01 1.02 
                             P-value (0.70) (0.67) (0.81) (0.68) (0.22) (0.20) (0.44) (0.50) (0.34) (0.34) 
Fitted target (%): Mean 7.00 11.51 7.00 11.51 7.00 11.51 7.00 11.51 7.00 11.51 
                             Maximum  14.90 25.10 14.90 25.10 14.90 25.10 14.90 25.10 14.90 25.10 
                             Minimum  1.32 3.40 1.32 3.40 1.32 3.40 1.32 3.40 1.32 3.40 
      -0.15
**  -0.07*** -0.04 -0.02 0.43 0.47 0.22 0.29 0.25 0.33 
Wald test (P-value) (0.01) (0.00) (0.16) (0.18) (0.56) (0.63) (0.64) (0.47) (0.28) (0.41) 
        0.03 0.03 0.09
*** 0.07*** -0.68* -0.72**  -0.58**  -0.67**  -0.54* -0.60**  
Wald test (P-value)  (0.38) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.04) 
Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net 
income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net 
loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assetst + total assetst-1)/2; 
Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk- and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between the 
target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one if control rights 
are greater than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios 
when the bank is below its target, and zero otherwise. The regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 4 (see their definition 
in Table A5 in Appendix A). Country and Year dummies are included but not reported. Detailed results are available on request. Hansen 
test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group; AR2 test=second order residual autocorrelation test. P-values based on robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
